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AN INTENTIONAL TORT THEORY OF PATENTS 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat* 
Abstract 
This Article challenges the dogma of U.S. patent law that direct 
infringement is a strict liability tort. Impermissibly practicing a patented 
invention does create liability even if the infringer did not intend to 
infringe or know about the patent. The consensus is that this is a form of 
strict liability. The flaw in the consensus is that it proves too little, for the 
same is true of intentional torts: intent to commit the tort is unnecessary, 
and ignorance of the legal right is no excuse. What is relevant is intent to 
perform the action that the law deems tortious. So for the tort of patent 
infringement, the question is whether liability should require that the 
infringer intended to perform the actions that constitute infringement. The 
patent statute and the few cases that have broached the question suggest 
the answer is yes—tortious intent should be necessary. However, patent 
law currently takes no position on tortious intent. The strict liability view 
is merely a default. This Article fills that gap by applying ordinary tort 
principles to patent infringement. The proposed framework offers a 
powerful policy lever for important issues implicating the notice function 
of patents, including divided infringement, claim construction, and 
inherency. This framework also mitigates the effects of patent assertion 
on risk allocation in the patent system by differentiating among makers, 
sellers, and users of patented innovation—a distinction that is 
economically important but has no principled basis in patent doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is conventional wisdom in patent law that direct infringement is a 
strict liability tort.1 A patent creates a right to exclude others from 
making, selling, or using the patented invention.2 Performing any of these 
activities—practicing the patented invention—without the patent 
owner’s permission is direct infringement of the patent.3 Infringing in this 
way creates liability even if the infringer did not intend to commit 
infringement or even know of the patent.4 If the infringer did intend to 
infringe or did know of the patent, then enhanced damages may be 
available for willful infringement.5 But the underlying direct 
infringement requires neither.6 These are the basic precepts of patent 
infringement. By the consensus view of patent law, these precepts amount 
to strict liability.7 
This consensus view is an unfortunate caricature of strict liability. 
Indeed, these precepts would be just as true if direct infringement were 
an intentional tort. Intentional torts, too, do not require intent to commit 
a tort or any knowledge that a legal right exists.8 What is relevant is the 
tortfeasor’s intent to perform an act that the law deems tortious.9 If direct 
infringement were an intentional tort, an infringer could still be liable 
without intending to infringe the patent and without knowing that the 
patent exists, so long as she intended to perform one of the actions that 
constitute infringement: making, selling, or using the patented invention. 
So, is patent infringement a strict liability tort, as patent law currently 
contends, or an intentional tort, which is just as plausible under the basic 
precepts of infringement? To decide, patent law must answer an 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“Infringement . . . is a strict liability offense.”), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17, 
34–35 (1997). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). The patent owner may also exclude others from offering the 
invention for sale or from importing the invention into the United States. Id. As a shorthand, this 
Article refers to “making, selling, and using,” except when analyzing the statutory text itself. See 
infra Subsection II.B.1. 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 4. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that patent 
infringement’s so-called strict liability character obliges courts to grant relief “regardless of the 
intent, culpability or motivation of the infringer”). 
 5. Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 986 (D. Del. 1982). 
 6. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1527. 
 7. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and 
Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 87 (1982) (referring to direct infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) as a strict liability tort). 
 8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 9. Id. (“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that 
the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it.”). 
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important doctrinal question: should direct infringement liability require 
that the alleged infringer intended to perform the actions that constitute 
infringement?  
If the answer is yes, then direct infringement is an intentional tort, but 
only in the ordinary sense that unintended actions cannot form the basis 
for liability. In fact, the patent statute supports this reading, as do the few 
judicial opinions that have implicitly addressed it. Those opinions found 
non-infringement because there was no tortious intent to perform the 
actions that infringed.10 This reasoning indicates that tortious intent is, 
indeed, necessary. However, if the answer is no, then even unintended 
actions can form the basis for direct infringement liability. Such a regime 
would be purely distributive, allocating cost and risk to the public without 
any respect for autonomy, personal agency, or purposive action. 
Nevertheless, though infringement doctrine routinely refers to strict 
liability, patent law does not currently say that the answer to the doctrinal 
question is no. Until now, patent law has ignored the question altogether. 
The consensus is nothing more than a default. 
The effects of this analytical gap are profound. By failing to answer 
the necessary doctrinal question about intended actions, while 
uncritically repeating the rhetoric of strict liability, patent law always 
risks drifting toward the latter, distributive regime of direct infringement. 
In that world, adequate public notice about the existence and boundaries 
of patent rights is essential to justifying the patent system, but virtually 
impossible to achieve. If someone may become liable for infringing a 
patent without any general or specific intent to perform the relevant 
actions, then the public bears all the cost and risk of avoiding actions that 
may turn out to infringe. As a result, the patent system must make 
abundantly clear ex ante the existence and scope of patent rights. The 
most forceful evidence of patent failure is notice failure, particularly 
where it benefits so-called patent trolls who trade on information 
asymmetries and ambiguities about the scope of patent rights. But if that 
world is largely the one in which we already live, it is not because patent 
law has broadly made the wrong normative choice about whether 
infringement should require intended actions. It is because patent law has 
failed to choose. 
The purpose of this Article is to raise that question and to answer yes. 
Direct infringement liability should require an underlying intent to make, 
sell, or use the patented invention—intent to perform the actions that 
constitute the tort of direct patent infringement. To clarify, this is simply 
tortious intent to perform certain actions, not the altogether different 
intent to commit infringement, which patent law separately penalizes 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Brothers v. United States, 52 Ct. Cl. 462, 467 (1917). 
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under the remedial doctrine of willful infringement and which would 
remain unnecessary for liability.11 Patent law’s ignorance of this 
distinction has created a number of normative problems by default.12 If, 
upon asking the question about intended actions, patent law now chooses 
to disregard the relevant intent behind actions that constitute 
infringement, then those normative problems will only become 
formalized and worsen. 
A first problem with disregarding tortious intent is that there is no 
principled basis for differentiating among different kinds of actors in the 
patent system based on their actions. This distinction is economically 
significant because the kinds of actions that can give rise to infringement 
occupy very different positions in the stream of commerce.13 Such actions 
also reflect divergent calculations of cost, risk, and reward. As a result, 
makers, sellers, and users all have their own distinct approaches to 
conducting patent searches and clearances, avoiding infringement, and 
even forgoing economically productive activity in some cases.  
For example, a complex and highly integrated product such as a tablet 
computer presents very different infringement risks for the various actors 
who cross paths with a single patented component of the tablet, such as a 
piece of storage hardware. The manufacturer of the component is likely 
to have considerable knowledge about its design and operation. As a 
result, the manufacturer’s act of making the component is likely to be 
intentional, even if the manufacturer is unaware of any relevant patents. 
By contrast, the downstream retailer of the fully manufactured tablet is 
less likely to know about the particular storage component when selling 
the tablet. As a result, the retailer’s act of selling the tablet is less likely 
to be intentional with respect to the component. And the end purchaser, 
concerned broadly with the tablet and likely ignorant of its inner 
workings, is probably the most poorly positioned to act with tortious 
intent as to the component when using the tablet. To sum up these 
differences, the manufacturer has the lowest information cost for 
avoiding infringement; the end user, the highest cost. It is therefore 
unsound policy to treat all of these actors as interchangeable potential 
infringers. However, differentiating among them necessarily means 
taking account of their various incentives to perform particular kinds of 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 986 (D. Del. 1982).  
 12. A broader set of critiques is also emerging around the incoherent roles of tortious intent 
in copyright infringement and trademark infringement, with calls for greater analytical precision 
about the tort theory underlying these doctrines. See, e.g., Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright 
Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 352–53 (2015); David 
Welkowitz, Fault Lines in Trademark Default Judgments, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 101, 107–08 
(2014). 
 13. See infra Section III.B. 
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actions that may infringe. The doctrine of tortious intent resolves that 
analytical problem,14 particularly for the prominent policy challenge of 
managing end user liability.15 
A second problem with disregarding tortious intent is that it 
indiscriminately imposes infringement liability on actions that are purely 
inadvertent or even unforeseeable, such as unexpectedly producing trace 
amounts of a chemical that happens to be patented in an otherwise 
permissible industrial process.16 Importantly, shielding inadvertent 
actions is a different question from that of shielding inadvertent 
infringement, which refers more broadly to all actions (whether 
intentional or not) that take place in ignorance of others’ patent rights.  
For example, one type of inadvertent infringement may be for a firm 
to carry out an industrial process designed to produce Chemical A but 
which unexpectedly produces a different Chemical B that, unbeknownst 
to the firm, turns out to be patented. Another type of inadvertent 
infringement may be for the firm deliberately to perform a method of 
measuring drug levels in the bloodstreams of patients and adjusting drug 
dosage accordingly, a method that unwittingly turns out to infringe a 
patent. In the former example, the act of producing Chemical B is 
inadvertent because the infringing compound was not an intended 
product of the process. The infringement is also inadvertent because the 
firm was unaware of the patent. In the latter example, the actions of 
measuring drug levels and adjusting dosage are intentional, and only the 
infringement is inadvertent. Some scholars, agencies, and legislators 
support immunizing even the latter, broader set where only the 
infringement is inadvertent. There is, therefore, at least as much support 
for immunizing actions that are purely inadvertent. Yet such immunity 
necessarily means asking whether the actor intended to commit such 
tortious actions. The doctrine of tortious intent also resolves this 
analytical problem of inadvertence, one that is especially pressing after 
problematic judicial precedents regarding the inherency doctrine.17 
A third problem with disregarding tortious intent is that it aggravates 
the systemic challenge of divided infringement, which arises when 
separate actions of multiple parties collectively infringe a patent. The 
U.S. Supreme Court faced the issue during the October 2013 Term in 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.18 after the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit produced a fractured en banc 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Section III.A. 
 15. See infra Subsection III.B.3. 
 16. E.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 17. See infra Section III.C. 
 18. 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
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decision.19 However, the Court’s opinion left open the fundamental 
question of how to decide whether to consider the conduct of multiple 
accused parties collectively.20 Without a principled basis for making this 
decision, courts necessarily risk crafting an error-prone rule. If the rule is 
over-inclusive, it will impose liability on wholly unrelated actors 
practicing freely available inventions.21 If the rule is under-inclusive, it 
will condone the violation of patent rights through strategically divided 
actions among parties acting deliberately in concert.22 The doctrine of 
tortious intent resolves this dilemma and offers the only principled way 
to do so.23 
A fourth problem is claim construction, which underlies all legal and 
factual conclusions of patent validity as well as the risk and actual 
occurrence of infringement. Claim construction poses a number of 
subsidiary questions, including how to construe claims in the first place, 
how horizontally to address prior constructions among district courts and 
administrative tribunals, and how vertically to address on appeal the 
constructions of lower courts. These questions reflect policy concerns 
about understanding patent boundaries accurately and precisely as well 
as about allocating decision-making authority between trial and appellate 
courts and between judicial and administrative institutions. Prominent 
among these concerns is the propriety of the purposive approach to claim 
construction. Purposive construction derives meaning from the patent 
text based on the purposes for which the patent was constituted, namely 
to protect the inventor’s invention.24 The approach remains controversial, 
and even courts that engage in it do not always do so transparently. The 
doctrine of tortious intent is consonant with purposive construction and 
offers a coherent justification for it.25 
In sum, this Article fills the analytical gap in direct patent 
infringement through the doctrine of tortious intent. Application of the 
doctrine proceeds from ordinary tort principles, the text of the Patent Act 
itself, and the few patent decisions that have examined intent to perform 
actions relevant to infringement. The result is a powerful new policy lever 
in current debates about patent notice and the effect of patent litigation 
on static and dynamic efficiency in the patent system.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I shows that the current view 
of patent infringement as a strict liability tort reflects a misunderstanding 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).  
 20. Id. at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 21. See infra Section III.A. 
 22. See infra Section III.A. 
 23. See infra Section III.A. 
 24. See infra Subsection III.E.2. 
 25. See infra Subsection III.E.2. 
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of tort law principles and discusses the normative implications of this 
mistake. Part II derives a theory of tortious intent based on a 
correspondence between the extent of a tortfeasor’s liability and the level 
of purposive action involved in her commission of the tort. Part III applies 
this theory to direct infringement, explains how requiring tortious intent 
for direct infringement liability is analytically consonant with other 
patent law doctrines, and discusses four major policy benefits that the 
doctrine of tortious intent offers for patent notice and abusive patent 
litigation. 
I.  PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS A STRICT LIABILITY TORT 
As for the basic act of direct infringement, there is a widespread view 
that patent law, when imposing liability, takes no account of intent to 
infringe the patent or of knowledge that the patent even exists.26 These 
facts are relevant only to identify indirect forms of infringement or to 
determine the appropriate remedy. Accordingly, commentators and even 
courts routinely refer to direct patent infringement as a strict liability 
offense.27 
A.  The Central Dogma 
This practice of referring to strict liability as the doctrinal baseline of 
infringement while sometimes departing from strict liability does not 
survive closer scrutiny. Evaluating recent Supreme Court case law 
reveals the conceptual incoherence of the strict liability dogma and 
invites a more careful look at what strict liability would actually mean. 
1.  The Strict Liability View in Patent Law 
Historically, the disregard for intent to infringe and for knowledge of 
the patent has long been a rule of U.S. patent infringement law, with cases 
as early as the 1840s taking as given that one “may have infringed without 
intending, or even knowing it; but he is not, on that account, the less an 
infringer.”28 By the time Professor Albert Walker first published his 1883 
treatise on patent law, it was well established that infringement required 
neither knowledge of the patent nor appreciation that one’s act constituted 
infringement.29 Subsequent editions affirmed this understanding and 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 27. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17, 34–35 (1997). 
 28. Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740); see also 
Parker v. Haworth, 18 F. Cas. 1135, 1136 (C.C.D. Ill. 1848) (No. 10,738) (instructing that “[t]he 
defendant may not have been aware of the plaintiff’s right”). 
 29. ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA § 377 (1st ed. 1883). 
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further clarified that independent invention without any knowledge of an 
existing patent did not avert infringement.30 However, as early as 
Professor William Robinson’s 1890 treatise, the general body of law 
disregarding infringer intent already included an exception for what 
would later become the doctrine of contributory infringement: 
But there are many actions, equivocal in character so far as 
the external operation is concerned, which are or are not acts 
of infringement according to the object contemplated by 
their actor,—actions otherwise innocent thus being regarded 
as violations of the rights secured by the patent, when 
intended as parts of a transaction which taken as a whole 
would be an infringement.31 
Professor Robinson discussed these equivocal actions—infringement 
by unlawful making, unlawful using, and unlawful selling—as part of a 
unitary doctrine for capturing direct and contributory infringers,32 and 
therefore asserted a role for intent that “has not been borne out by 
subsequent developments.”33 For example, his discussion of infringement 
by unlawful making contemplates distinctions between making as a 
construction and making as a repair,34 a distinction whose current form 
does not consider the infringer’s intent at all.35 His discussion also 
contemplates permissible makings for experimental purposes, though the 
experimental use exception is widely regarded as all but a dead letter,36 
particularly after the Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey v. Duke 
University.37 Nevertheless, Professor Robinson’s evaluation of allegedly 
infringing actions based on “the object contemplated by their actor” is not 
wholly misplaced, as it reflects an intuitive distinction between intending 
to infringe and intending to perform actions that constitute infringement, 
a distinction as meaningful as it is overlooked.38 
 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See 3 ANTHONY W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS: DELLER’S EDITION § 453 (1937); 
ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS § 377 (5th ed. 1917); 
ALBERT H. WALKER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS § 433 (6th ed. 1929). 
 31. 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 901 (1890). 
 32. See id. §§ 903–06. 
 33. 4 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 14:17 (Westlaw 4th ed. 2015). 
 34. 3 ROBINSON, supra note 31, § 903. 
 35. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105–06 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(discussing the repair–reconstruction dichotomy). 
 36. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Genetic Information, 65 ALA. 
L. REV. 625, 678 (2014). 
 37. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that use is not experimental if it is “in 
keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged infringer”); see also Kumar, supra note 36, at 
678–79 (arguing for a statutory research exemption after the Madey decision). 
 38. See infra Subsection I.A.3. 
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Apart from the general acceptance that intent is irrelevant to direct 
infringement, the designation of this principle as a form of strict liability 
is also widespread, though not as long-established. This vocabulary of 
strict liability pervades the scholarly discussion of both patent 
infringement39 and analogous infringements of other intellectual property 
rights.40 In the face of this literature framing patent infringement as a 
strict liability tort, courts in the last twenty years have followed suit.41 
The Federal Circuit has even elaborated further, discussing strict liability 
not only as a characterization to be inferred from the historical disregard 
for both intent to infringe and knowledge of the patent, but also as a 
premise to guide both the infringement analysis itself42 and the resolution 
of related issues such as evidentiary relevance.43 
2.  Departures from Strict Liability in Patent Law 
Still, despite this adherence to a strict liability conception of direct 
patent infringement, not all violations of patent rights give rise to strict 
liability, and the strict liability designation carries caveats in the 
literature. Willful infringement, induced infringement, and contributory 
infringement all require some level of purposive action, such as 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 7, at 87. 
 40. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and 
Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 52 n.29 (1989) (arguing that direct 
infringement incurs strict liability not only for patents but also for trademarks and copyrights); 
Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 347, 381 n.162 (1983) (comparing a potential strict liability rule for innocent unauthorized 
use of trade secrets with the accepted strict liability rule of action for direct patent infringement 
under § 271(a)). Notably, independent creation is a defense to infringement in copyright and trade 
secrecy, necessarily moderating the practical reach of any discussion regarding infringer intent. 
Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (noting, with respect to the doctrine of equivalents, that “[i]nfringement is, and should 
remain, a strict liability offense”), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17, 34–35 (1997) (accepting 
the Federal Circuit’s intent-neutral view of infringement—notably, without using the language of 
strict liability). 
 42. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that 
patent infringement’s so-called strict liability character obliges courts to grant relief “regardless 
of the intent, culpability or motivation of the infringer”). 
 43. See, e.g., Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 256 F.R.D. 229, 232 (D.D.C. 2009). In pertinent 
part, the court in Intervet held that a disputed interrogatory was relevant and therefore 
discoverable. Id. The interrogatory inquired about the circumstances under which the alleged 
infringer became aware of the patent-in-suit. Id. at 231. The court recognized that information is 
relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 if “it is likely to make a material fact more or less 
likely,” and awareness of the patent could be material or not depending on whether the patentee 
had alleged direct infringement alone (immaterial) or something more, requiring knowledge of 
the patent or intent to infringe (material). Id. at 232. Notably, the court expressly invoked the 
“strict liability” view of direct infringement. Id. 
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recklessness or actual intent, or some level of knowledge such as 
constructive or actual notice that the patent exists and is infringed.44 Yet 
even these modest departures only underscore the more fundamental 
mistake of regarding the basic act of direct infringement a strict liability 
tort. 
Liability for willful infringement arises only where an infringer acts 
recklessly, that is, “despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 
constituted infringement of a valid patent.”45 Proceeding recklessly in this 
manner does not itself create infringement liability—that threshold issue 
is still regarded as one of strict liability—but may warrant the imposition 
of enhanced damages up to threefold what the judge or jury assesses 
under 35 U.S.C. § 284.46 Seagate overruled the previous willful 
infringement standard set forth in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison–
Knudsen Co.47 that a potential infringer with “actual notice of another’s 
patent rights . . . has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine 
whether or not he is infringing.”48 The effect of Underwater Devices and 
its progeny included a duty to obtain competent advice of counsel prior 
to any possible infringing activity49 and the possibility that an absence of 
legal counsel could imply willfulness,50 though the Federal Circuit later 
relaxed the drawing of such adverse inferences.51 Thus, whereas 
Underwater Devices required actual notice of the patent but only 
negligence with regard to determining and avoiding infringement,52 
Seagate requires recklessness with regard to determining and avoiding 
infringement but has no explicit requirement as to notice.53 Under the 
“objectively high likelihood of infringement” standard in Seagate, a 
willful infringer will either ignore the likelihood that a known patent will 
be infringed or the likelihood that a relevant patent exists at all. For 
example, given a technology space crowded with many patents, Seagate 
might well support a finding of recklessness, and therefore of willful 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See infra notes 45–62 and accompanying text. 
 45. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 46. Id. at 1368 & n.3 (noting that “[b]ecause patent infringement is a strict liability offense, 
the nature of the offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are 
warranted”).  
 47. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 48. Id. at 1389. 
 49. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 50. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579–80 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 51. Knorr–Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 52. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389–90. 
 53. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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infringement, based on a failure to conduct a patent search.54 
By contrast, liability for induced infringement requires that the alleged 
inducer knew that the actions she induced constituted infringement.55 
However, actual knowledge of the patent’s existence is not necessary: it 
is enough that the alleged inducer believed there was a high probability 
that the combination of the components was patented and took deliberate 
steps to avoid actual knowledge of that fact.56 Liability for contributory 
infringement has an even higher standard. This standard requires that the 
alleged contributor actually knew that the combination to which her 
component contributed was both patented and infringing.57  
Thus, the statutory actions for induced and contributory infringement 
are meaningfully different from the common law remedial basis of willful 
infringement.58 One result of this difference is that, read in pari materia 
with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which defines infringement as a basic matter,59 
both the induced and contributory infringement statutes require an 
underlying direct infringement.60 A second result of this difference is that, 
for willful infringement, courts may more readily reshape the necessary 
level of knowledge about the existence or infringement of a patent or of 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See Tomita Techs. USA, LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 11-4256, 2012 WL 2524770, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012). The court in Tomita explained: 
While an alleged infringer may often need to know of a patent’s existence and 
scope in order to adequately comprehend the risk she faces, this case amply 
demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, an alleged infringer can know of an 
“objectively high likelihood” of infringement even though she does not know 
that the relevant patent has issued. 
Id. at *10. But see Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 3d 320, 335 (D. Del. 2014) 
(distinguishing Tomita, the court in Robocast did not find it necessary that an alleged infringer 
conduct a patent search, stating “[i]t seems contrary to waive the requirement for a non-
infringement opinion when the defendant has knowledge of the patent and yet require a defendant 
to undertake a search to see if a patent existed in the first place”). 
 55. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). 
 56. Id. at 2070–71. 
 57. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964) (“Aro 
II”). 
 58. The Patent Act creates induced infringement liability in § 271(b) and contributory 
infringement liability in § 271(c). 
 59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 60. Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple Inc., 692 F.3d 1351, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining 
that “[i]nducement of infringement requires that there be a showing of an underlying act of direct 
infringement”); Aro II, 377 U.S. at 483 (“[I]t is settled that if there is no direct infringement of a 
patent there can be no contributory infringement.” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961) (“Aro I”))). 
 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss2/8
2016] AN INTENTIONAL TORT THEORY OF PATENTS 583 
 
intent that can be inferred from that knowledge.61 For induced and 
contributory infringement, however, the levels of intent that are more 
directly implicated in the statutory text make such common law revision 
both more unlikely to occur and more incremental when they do.62 
These various heightened requirements of knowledge and intent for 
imposing liability for indirect patent infringement have also been the 
subject of thoughtful academic discussion. Notable among this discussion 
are arguments to reformulate the conception of fault away from a mental 
state inquiry,63 to explore the potential inaptitude of culpability or intent 
in quantum-mechanical arts such as nanotechnology,64 and even to recast 
the current patent infringement system as one of “modified strict 
liability,” often requiring notice of the patent.65 Like the case law, 
however, these arguments accept as given that the underlying act of direct 
infringement is a strict liability tort for which liability itself does not 
require any intent to infringe nor any notice or knowledge of the patent 
or its infringement.66 
3.  Doubling Down on Strict Liability 
The rhetoric and implications of strict liability in patent infringement 
are even more salient after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.67 The dispute in Commil was 
one of induced infringement,68 but the posture of the case raised a side 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (expressly 
overruling the standard for willful infringement set forth in Underwater Devices nearly a quarter-
century earlier). 
 62. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (according 
not only the “special force” of stare decisis to the construction in [Aro II], 377 U.S. 476, of the 
intent inquiry for contributory infringement under § 271(c), but also adhering to the same logic in 
construing the analogous intent inquiry for induced infringement under § 271(b)). 
 63. See Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2011). 
 64. See Siddharth Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability 
to Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 179, 183 (2007). 
 65. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent 
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 807–08 (2002). 
 66. See id. at 800–01 (distinguishing between being liable for infringement, for which the 
“strict liability” designation is acceptable, and recovering damages, for which the 35 U.S.C. § 287 
patent-marking statute requires notice of the patent); Khanijou, supra note 64, at 197 (accepting 
direct infringement as a strict liability offense for purposes of infringement liability while 
identifying, as Professors Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter do, a notice requirement for the 
recovery of damages); Rantanen, supra note 63, at 1590 (accepting direct infringement as a strict 
liability offense and focusing instead on willful, induced, and contributory infringement). 
 67. See 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
 68. Id. at 1924. 
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debate over direct infringement as well.69 The case marked the Court’s 
third recent foray into the tort underpinnings of patent infringement 
doctrine. 
The first was Global-Tech, in which the Court held that induced 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) requires intent and knowledge not 
merely that the induced actions took place but also that the induced 
actions constituted infringement.70 The Court in Global-Tech drew a 
basic tort distinction between mental states regarding actions in the world 
and mental states regarding those actions’ legal consequences.71 As the 
Court concluded, induced infringement requires both.72  
The second was Limelight, in which the Court held that indirect 
infringement requires an underlying direct infringement.73 The dispute 
before the Court was the divided infringement of a method patent 
conducted at arm’s length: Limelight had performed some steps, and 
other parties outside Limelight’s control had performed the rest.74 The en 
banc Federal Circuit held Limelight liable for inducement by finding that 
while no one was liable for an underlying direct infringement, the 
requisite underlying infringement had taken place because all the steps 
had been performed.75 The Court rejected this notion of joint tortfeasance, 
explaining that if the actions that supposedly constitute direct 
infringement are not enough to create liability, then what has taken place 
is not direct infringement.76 
In both cases, the Court analyzed the intent standard of induced 
infringement by comparing it to direct infringement, which produced 
helpful partial answers. Global-Tech properly distinguished between 
intent as to actions and intent as to the actions’ legal implications.77 
Limelight originally punted on that distinction as to direct infringement, 
though it did pose the issue helpfully through divided infringement: even 
if the actions of multiple parties when considered collectively would 
directly infringe a patent, why should their actions be considered 
collectively in the first place?78 The question, though helpful, remained 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 1926. 
 70. Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). 
 71. Id. at 2065. 
 72. Id. at 2067–68. 
 73. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115 (2014). 
 74. Id. at 2115–16. 
 75. Id. at 2116–17. 
 76. Id. at 2117–18. 
 77. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065 and text accompanying note 71. On rehearing, an 
en banc Federal Circuit addressed this distinction. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, 
Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 78. Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117–18. For a more detailed discussion of the proper role for 
tortious intent in divided patent infringement, see infra Section III.D. 
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unanswered in Limelight.79 
Prior to Commil, induced infringement required the following 
conditions: A patent must actually be directly infringed; the alleged 
inducer must know that it induced certain actions; and the alleged inducer 
must know that the actions that it induced constituted infringement of the 
patent.80 The question before the Court in Commil was whether the 
alleged inducer must also know that the patent was valid—whether a 
good-faith belief in the patent’s invalidity is sufficient to defeat a claim 
of induced infringement.81 The Federal Circuit majority in Commil 
correctly observed that because direct infringement requires a patent to 
be valid,82 intent or knowledge that the patent is valid is relevant to the 
requisite intent or knowledge that the direct infringement took place.83 
Put another way, just as one cannot infringe an invalid patent, someone 
who believes in good faith that a patent is invalid cannot intend for it to 
be infringed.84 
Affirming the Federal Circuit’s conclusion in Commil would, 
desirably, have identified even more clearly the tort law distinction 
between mental states regarding (induced) actions and mental states 
regarding the legal implications of those actions. Yet, the Court in 
Commil ignored this distinction and said only that “infringement and 
validity are separate issues under the [Patent] Act,” so knowledge or 
intent regarding one does not necessarily implicate knowledge or intent 
regarding the other.85 
Moreover, the Court’s opinion did not merely forgo an opportunity to 
clarify the confused view of tortious intent in patent infringement 
doctrine. It also echoed the Government’s (supporting Commil) 
                                                                                                                     
 79. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion and remanded the 
case for further consistent proceedings, and the Federal Circuit reiterated its earlier conclusion 
that the facts of the case did not satisfy the governing standard for divided infringement (this time 
without its overturned inducement theory). On rehearing in the Federal Circuit, the court 
addressed infringement divided among different actors and found that entities can be responsible 
for others’ performance in two instances: “(1) where that entity directs or controls others’ 
performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.” 
 80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 
1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 13-896), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014), and vacated, 135 
S. Ct. 1920 (2015).  
 81. Id. at i (seeking review on “[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a 
defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b)”). 
 82. Commil, 720 F.3d at 1368 (explaining that “[i]t is axiomatic that one cannot infringe an 
invalid patent”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Brief of Professor Saurabh Vishnubhakat as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 2–3, Commil, 135 S. Ct. 1920 (No. 13-896). 
 85. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928. 
 
15
Vishnubhakat: An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
586 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
interpretation of the Court’s own prior dicta that direct infringement, as a 
baseline matter, is a strict liability offense.86 
Tracing this dicta backward from Commil provides some of the 
clearest provenance for the strict liability error in patent law. In Commil, 
the Court cited a footnote from Global–Tech, which states, “Direct 
infringement has long been understood to require no more than the 
unauthorized use of a patented invention. Thus, a direct infringer’s 
knowledge or intent is irrelevant.”87 The footnote fails to support the 
strict liability conclusion. On its own terms, it does not specify what is 
irrelevant about the alleged direct infringer’s mental state: knowledge or 
intent about its own actions, or knowledge or intent about the legal 
consequences of those actions. 
In fact, both of the sources the Commil Court cited suggest only that 
knowledge or intent about legal consequences is irrelevant.88 The Court’s 
1964 opinion in Aro II only restated the text of § 271(a) that making, 
using, or selling the invention without authority is an infringement.89 
Professor Walker and, later, Professor Anthony Deller explained that 
only direct infringement requires neither knowledge of the patent nor 
appreciation that one’s act is infringement.90 These propositions, without 
more, do not amount to strict liability. If either treatise could plausibly 
have concluded that one can be a direct infringer even without intent to 
commit the relevant actions, for example, strict liability would have been 
a more defensible view. 
Because the role of tortious intent in direct infringement was not 
before the Court in Commil,91 this passing reference to strict liability 
remains dicta, but it highlights the pervasiveness of the confusion that 
surrounds the infringement doctrine with respect to its tort underpinnings. 
4.  What Strict Liability Really Means 
Looking to tort law itself is a useful way to compare what strict 
liability means as a conceptual matter to evaluate what it means in the 
borrowed sense that patent law has employed. At first blush, it may seem 
formalistic to distinguish between standards such as actual intent, 
recklessness, and willful blindness for determining willful infringement 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Id. at 1926. 
 87. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
 88. See Aro II, 377 U.S. at 484; 3 DELLER, supra note 30, § 453. 
 89. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 484. 
 90. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 91. Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1926 (stating that the “precise issue to be addressed concerns a 
claim of improper inducement to infringe”). 
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on one hand92 and so-called strict liability for determining direct 
infringement on the other hand. Certainly, the Federal Circuit has a well-
documented reputation for formalism in its jurisprudence.93 It is also 
questionable whether tort law itself supports such distinctions. If not, then 
the best argument for distinguishing among levels of purposive action in 
various forms of patent infringement may be simply that patent 
jurisprudence requires some measure of formalism to minimize needless 
disruption to existing doctrine. Nevertheless, if tort law does plausibly 
support such distinctions, then the case is even stronger insofar as the 
debates in tort theory can offer greater transparency to the applied case 
of the tort of patent infringement. 
In fact, categorical distinctions are not anathema to tort. Despite the 
general hostility in modern tort law toward formalism or conceptualism,94 
early legal realist views of tort were more concerned with rejecting any 
single unifying theory of tort doctrine.95 In this project, realist tort 
scholars such as Professor Fleming James readily adopted categorical 
distinctions when it suited them.96 It was Professor James himself who 
first differentiated intentional torts, negligent torts, and so-called strict 
liability torts to describe what he called the “heterogeneous mass of stuff” 
that was injury law.97 
Tort law’s own view of strict liability is mixed. The corrective justice 
strain of the tort literature increasingly questions whether strict liability 
even exists any longer as a doctrine that is analytically distinct from 
negligence.98 For example, in his unambiguously titled assessment, The 
Death of Strict Liability, Professor Peter Gerhart argued that strict 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for willful 
infringement). 
 93. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit 
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2003) (discussing the Federal 
Circuit’s bias of articulating bright-line rules at the cost of fairness and the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions enabling this formalism agenda); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1103–10 (2003) 
[hereinafter Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy] (reviewing Federal Circuit formalism in the context 
of patent reform); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 
(2003) (exploring the recent trends in the Federal Circuit toward formalism and its potential for 
negatively impacting innovation policy).  
 94. See James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products 
Liability: A Case Study in American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 443, 490–
91 (1995) (describing the “anti-formalist turn in American thought” that characterized the 
pragmatic development of strict liability). 
 95. Id. at 490. 
 96. See Fleming James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 
BUFF. L. REV. 315, 321 (1959). 
 97. Id. at 315. 
 98. Peter M. Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 245, 271 (2008). 
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liability was originally different from negligence in only one way.99 
Negligence could penalize no more than failures to exercise due care, but 
reasonable care could still produce externalities that the law has a 
normative interest in mitigating.100 To cast the necessary wider net, so-
called strict liability arose to evaluate not the quality of care, but the 
quality of the decision making related to the activity itself.101 Such 
decisions may pertain to a variety of traits associated with the activity, 
such as where or when it is done, how frequently, and by what method.102 
In fact, these more finely grained evaluations of activity-based decisions 
are a subset of the general label of “abnormally dangerous” or 
“ultrahazardous” activities with which strict liability is traditionally 
identified.103 Importantly, however, evaluating activity-based decisions 
does not require wholly disregarding fault as in the customary 
understanding of strict liability.104 
The upshot, according to Professor Gerhart, is that in trying to move 
beyond the inability of negligence to deter conduct that is reasonable as 
to due care but unreasonable in other ways, the notion of strict liability 
has been an overcompensation. On one hand, a fault-based view of 
unreasonable activity-based decisions can cast the wider net that strict 
liability purports to offer. In other words, the strict liability cases would, 
in the main, have turned out the same if the courts had more precisely 
evaluated the quality of the tortfeasor’s activity-based decisions rather 
than claiming broadly to allocate liability without fault.105 On the other 
hand, activity-based decisions may also be reasonable as to place, time, 
frequency, method, etc., leaving a pure residual risk of the truly 
unavoidable accident—one that could take place even if one exercised 
due care and made entirely reasonable activity-based decisions.106 The 
strict liability cases have not imposed liability to the extent of these truly 
unavoidable accidents, where even activity-based decisions were 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 251 (summarizing the difference between so-called strict liability and negligence). 
See generally Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007) (discussing a theoretical treatment of strict 
liability as an incentive system for reducing accident costs); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus 
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (comparing strict liability and negligence rules based on 
the incentives they provide). 
 100. Gerhart, supra note 98, at 251. 
 101. Id. at 251–53. 
 102. Id. at 247. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 257–58. 
 105. Id. at 297–306 (arguing that the outcomes of strict liability cases are actually 
applications of Gerhart’s fault-based theory). 
 106. Id. at 254–55. 
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reasonable.107 Indeed, the only way to force actors to internalize the pure 
residual risk of truly unavoidable accidents would be to turn to some 
purely distributive justice theory of tort where loss distribution entirely 
trumps individual agency, though the current body of tort law has largely 
remained with corrective justice.108 
Historically, this distinction between activity-based risks that persist 
despite due care and residual risks that represent truly unavoidable 
accidents has been most salient in the context of products liability.109 In 
that context, the philosophical arguments of pragmatism, the policy 
prescriptions of institutional economics, and the jurisprudential approach 
of legal realism ultimately led to a pair of seminal judicial decisions that 
articulated what the purpose and profile of strict liability would be.110 
First was MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,111 in which the purchaser 
of a car was injured when a defective wooden wheel in the car crumbled, 
causing the car to collapse.112 Though defendant Buick had not 
manufactured the wheel but merely installed it, Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
found liability “irrespective of [privity of] contract” because Buick had 
knowledge of a probable danger and had a duty to make its automobiles 
with care.113 
The second was Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,114 in 
which a restaurant waitress was injured when a bottle of Coca Cola 
spontaneously exploded in her hand, severing a number of blood vessels, 
nerves, and muscles in her thumb and palm.115 Though the court found 
defendant Coca Cola liable on a fault-based res ipsa loquitor theory of 
negligence,116 Justice Roger Traynor in a concurring opinion argued for 
what he called an “absolute liability” for manufacturers who place articles 
in commerce that prove injuriously defective.117 Less than twenty years 
later, the Escola concurrence prevailed in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc.,118 with Justice Traynor writing for a unanimous court.119 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 307 (accepting that “no-fault liability is theoretically possible” but that all cases 
of accidents, despite due care, were actually about unreasonable activity-based decision-
making—and thus still about fault). 
 108. Id. at 248–49. 
 109. See id. at 286–88. 
 110. Hackney, supra note 94, at 489 (referring to “the landmark judicial opinions” 
implementing the theoretical legal realist case for strict liability). 
 111. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 112. Id. at 1051. 
 113. Id. at 1053. 
 114. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).  
 115. Id. at 438. 
 116. Id. at 440. 
 117. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 118. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).  
 119. Id. at 898. 
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These formative product liability cases suggest the uncertainly 
cabined nature of strict liability. In MacPherson, Justice Cardozo 
declined to divorce the defendant manufacturer’s purposive actions from 
its liability, expressly requiring knowledge on the part of the 
manufacturer of a danger “not merely possible, but probable.”120 By 
comparison in Escola, Justice Traynor made an essentially distributive 
argument regarding a manufacturer’s ability to internalize the cost to 
“reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products.”121 
However, he justified this allocation of risk on the grounds that the risk 
of injury or defect associated with manufacturing is “a constant risk and 
a general one,” thus requiring a constant and general protection that the 
manufacturer is best positioned to provide.122 How constant and how 
general the risk may be are empirical questions, and the manufacturer can 
undoubtedly do much to mitigate that risk by internalizing the cost of 
changing its activity-based decisions.123 Yet expanding tort liability 
beyond failures of due care to failures of activity-based decisions is still 
a fault-based regime. 
What remains unclear is whether this activity-based view of products 
liability fully realizes Justice Traynor’s concerns in Escola, or whether 
products liability is so distributive as to capture pure residual risk akin, 
in Professor Gerhart’s example, to requiring one person to be liable when 
lightning strikes another.124 The literature suggests that neither is fully 
true: fully distributive strict liability is the rule for manufacturing defects 
whereas a fault-based reasonableness standard is the rule for design 
defects and warning defects.125 
From this debate within tort law itself of what strict liability comprises 
and of what corrective and distributive values strict liability promotes, 
patent law can gain much needed clarity about how to allocate the risks, 
costs, and losses associated with the tort of patent infringement. The 
instrumental goals and balances involved in patent infringement and 
related doctrines do not justify a fully distributive form of economic 
liability that is concerned only with spreading loss without regard to 
agency or purposive action. Therefore, the way tort law frames the 
concept of strict liability is not only a careless view of direct 
infringement, but also a normatively inappropriate one. An important 
                                                                                                                     
 120. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916). 
 121. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 122. Id. at 441. 
 123. See Gerhart, supra note 98, at 247 (discussing the activity-based parameters of place, 
time, frequency, and method). 
 124. Id. at 311. 
 125. See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability 
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 744.  
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result of this mistaken strict liability view is that the burden of avoiding 
infringement appears to fall entirely on the public’s ability to understand 
precisely the boundaries of patent rights—entirely on the patent notice 
requirement. 
B.  The Overburdened Notice Requirement 
Critiques and defenses of the U.S. patent system regard notice as an 
essential function and diverge largely on whether the current system 
adequately performs that function.126 The indeterminacy that results from 
inadequate notice is forceful evidence that the law does not warrant the 
exclusionary power of patents and that their assertion is an illegitimate 
restraint of economic activity. Notice itself is not a unitary principle but 
rather a shorthand for two related requirements of the patent system—
one prescriptive and the other descriptive. These forms of notice, in turn, 
call for precision and accuracy to be effective. For evaluating the impact 
of a strict liability view on direct infringement, it is precision in 
prescriptive notice that is of greatest importance.  
1.  Two Metaphors of Patent Notice 
Prescriptive notice, or boundary notice about the scope of a patent’s 
claims, is what most discussions of the patent system mean by the term 
“notice” in advocacy,127 adjudication,128 and academic discourse.129 
Descriptive notice, or notice about the nature of the invention and how to 
practice it, is more commonly understood as the teaching function of 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Compare, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–72 (2009) (arguing that patents 
currently provide inadequate notice as to their boundaries and therefore do not merit their broad 
property-like rights to enjoin others), with David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future 
Through Innovation: How the Debate over the Smart Phone Patent Wars (Re)Raises Issues at the 
Foundation of Long-Term Incentive Systems, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 485, 494–97 (2013) 
(arguing that ongoing administrative reforms in patent examination together with recent Federal 
Circuit case law and industry best practices have improved the clarity and correspondence 
between what patents disclose and what they claim, largely fulfilling the notice function). 
 127. See, e.g., Defendant-Appellee’s Response to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening En Banc 
Brief at 40, McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 2011), 
2011 WL 3796780 (citing Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing the function of the patent system’s public notice function as providing 
“notice of the boundaries of the right to exclude”). 
 128. See, e.g., Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (2005) 
(referring to notice as information about the “enforceable boundary of the commercial patent 
right”). 
 129. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking 
Patent Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745–46 (2009) (describing the notice 
function of patents as “setting out clear boundaries to warn the public of what is and is not 
claimed”). 
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patents.130 Thus, the institutional design of the patent system must resolve 
two subjects of indeterminacy: (1) the boundary notice function of 
delineating ex ante the scope of the exclusionary rights that a patent 
confers and (2) the teaching function of describing and enabling the 
practice of the patented invention. 
Debate over the operation and fulfillment of the boundary notice and 
teaching functions has relied much on metaphors of trespass and contract, 
respectively.131 The boundary notice function reflects a need for clear, 
discernible limits so that others may avoid trespassing on the patentee’s 
rights similar to how physical fences guard against unauthorized entry on 
real property.132 The teaching function reflects a bargained-for exchange 
between an inventor and society where the inventor conveys a descriptive 
and enabling disclosure about her invention while in return society 
conveys a limited right for the inventor to exclude others from practicing 
it.133 Both metaphors resonate strongly in American culture—the trespass 
metaphor with the importance of private property134 and the contract 
metaphor with the importance of agreement as an exercise of 
autonomy.135 In this conception, moreover, the contract must precede the 
trespass because the bargain between inventor and society is what 
legitimates the inventor’s property-like right against the encroachment of 
others’ practice of her invention. If a patent does not give adequate notice 
about its boundaries, then the inventor has not kept her end of the patent 
bargain, and her exclusionary assertion of the patent is no longer a 
protection of her own rights against encroachment but is rather an 
illegitimate encroachment on the rights of others. Thus, the patent 
holder’s argument from trespass is in tension with the alleged 
                                                                                                                     
 130. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (2004) 
(distinguishing notice about what the invention is and how to practice it from notice about the 
boundaries of what the patent allows one to exclude others from doing). 
 131. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Cognitive Economy and the Trespass Fallacy: A Response to 
Professor Mossoff, 65 FLA. L. REV. F. 38, 38–39 (2014). 
 132. E.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (referring to the violation 
of a patent right as a “trespass”). See generally Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent 
Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692–94 (describing the history of the trespass metaphor in patent 
law). 
 133. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (describing the patent 
system as “a carefully crafted bargain”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 
(1973) (describing disclosure as “the quid pro quo of the right to exclude”). The Supreme Court 
has further noted that the metaphor of bargained-for exchange is particular to patents. See Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (stating that “our references to a quid pro quo typically 
appear in the patent context”). 
 134. David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 677 
(2010). 
 135. Tal Kastner, The Persisting Ideal of Agreement in an Age of Boilerplate, 35 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 793, 796–97 (2010). 
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infringer’s—indeed, society’s—argument from contract. 
The practical effect of this tension on direct infringement is that the 
delineation of clear boundaries in the patent right is the more important 
aspect of patent notice, as the boundaries of the patent are what define 
whether infringement has taken place at all. The patent bargain, for its 
part, is presumed to be fulfilled because the law itself presumes that an 
issued patent is valid.136 Moreover, in a regime widely believed to impose 
strict liability for direct infringement, without regard to prior knowledge 
of the patent or intent to commit infringement, proper boundary notice 
bears the heavy burden of legitimating the exclusionary power of patents 
against the public. As the ongoing debate over ex ante notice of claim 
scope shows, that burden as currently understood is likely an unbearable 
one. 
2.  Notice of Claim Scope 
Because the boundaries of patent rights reside in the claims of a 
patent,137 evaluating boundary notice is an exercise in construing patent 
claims.138 Claims that do not lend themselves to ex ante construction139 
reflect poor boundary notice,140 a problem that is particularly acute where 
it requires expensive litigation to adjudicate the boundary of the patent 
right.141 To be sure, the mere fact that litigation has taken place is not 
conclusive of notice failure nor even necessarily of uncertainty more 
                                                                                                                     
 136. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). The party asserting invalidity bears the burden of overcoming 
the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, even when offering evidence not before the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during examination. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–50 (2011). 
 137. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1280–84 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (observing that a patent claim “sets the boundaries of an exclusionary 
right good against the world at large”), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (remanding 
for reconsideration in light of Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 
(2015)). 
 138. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Open E Cry, LLC, 728 F.3d 1309, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 139. The amenability of patent claims to being construed is the patent “definiteness” 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). In recent years, the standard for definiteness had been that a 
claim, read in view of the specification and prosecution history, was indefinite only if it was 
“insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction” could “properly be adopted.” Exxon 
Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court 
very recently rejected this “insolubly ambiguous” standard and held that for a claim to be definite, 
it must “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” 
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129–30 (2014). 
 140. See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1737, 1772–74 (2011) (relating the susceptibility of patent claims to unique, or at least 
manageable, determination with the sufficiency of notice provided by the patent). 
 141. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 5, 10 (2013). 
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generally. Patent litigation proceeds for a variety of reasons, including 
high value in the invention142 and economic calculations favoring 
efficient infringement,143 as well as uncertainty about whether the patent 
is valid or infringed.144 Nevertheless, where so-called “fuzzy 
boundaries”145 result in patent scope that is de facto broad,146 and where 
the exclusionary right is strong and property-like—stronger, in fact, if 
strict liability is the rule—the increased risk of infringement can 
aggravate the externalities that strategic litigation generates.147 
Framing boundary notice with respect to consistency in claim 
construction is only one of two tasks in generating certainty about the 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439–40 (2004) 
(discussing the relationships among the value of inventions, the value of patents, and the assertion 
of patents in litigation to appropriate value). 
 143. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
517, 557–58 (arguing that substantial disagreement over patent validity and scope coupled with 
high transaction costs in ex ante license negotiation may make infringement the economically 
efficient choice). Professor Ted Sichelman compares this to efficient breach in contract theory. 
Id. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119–21 (7th ed. 2007)). 
 144. See Jay Pil Choi, Patent Litigation as an Informational-Transmission Mechanism, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 1249, 1250 (1998) (framing the dynamics of market entry as an externality of 
patent validity information revealed in litigation). See generally Alan C. Marco & Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103 (2013) (surveying the sources and 
implications of uncertainty about the validity and infringement of patents, and estimating the 
market value of resolving that uncertainty through adjudicative litigation).  
 145. Professor Michael Meurer has helped popularize this term in the debate over patent 
notice. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 126, at 61, 70; Menell & Meurer, supra note 141, 
at 12; Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 701–03 
(2009). 
 146. See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 
245–46 (2011); see also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the 
Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 
61, 63, 68–69, 70, 77–95 (2006) (using a game-theoretic model to compare quantitatively the 
litigation costs and risks as between plaintiff and defendant, and finding that even demonstrably 
invalid patents can survive in the market as a result). Uncertainty in boundaries results in 
effectively broad boundaries due to risk aversion about the outcomes of patent litigation. See 
generally Andrews, supra, at 219 (arguing that the cost and risk of patent litigation have 
diminished the value of traditional remedies such as damages and injunctions, leaving patentees 
to plan deliberately around a likely up-front settlement).  
 147. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 384 (2010) (arguing 
that such litigation “mak[es] the damage award or injunction value to the patentee inefficiently 
high relative to the social value of commercialization”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009–10 (2007) (arguing that where 
a patent owner has the ability and legal right “to capture value that has nothing to do with its 
invention,” the threat of litigation that it can exert results in economically inefficient disincentives 
for innovation by others, allegedly infringing firms that have often already sunk significant 
investments into research and development themselves). 
 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss2/8
2016] AN INTENTIONAL TORT THEORY OF PATENTS 595 
 
scope of patent rights,148 but it is the more important task. Accordingly, 
the Federal Circuit in Lighting Ballast Control v. Philips Electronics149 
endorsed the importance of consistent claim construction for providing 
what the court called “horizontal certainty,” which is of great importance 
to the market.150 Supplying this interpretive uniformity through de novo 
appellate review of claim construction may create “vertical uncertainty” 
about the outcomes of individual patent litigations, though the Lighting 
Ballast court appears to have accepted amicus representations that such 
vertical uncertainty costs are minimal.151 In practice, greater horizontal 
certainty means that a patent claim will mean the same thing in one 
district court as in subsequent district courts that construe the same claim. 
Greater vertical certainty means that a patent claim will turn out to mean 
the same thing in the appellate court as in the trial court below, usually 
due to a deferential standard of appellate review. Yet horizontal and 
vertical certainty are often in tension with each other. 
For example, high horizontal certainty would likely coincide with low 
vertical certainty because de novo review of the claim construction would 
create actual appellate precedent that consistently binds subsequent trial 
courts. Conversely, high vertical certainty would likely coincide with low 
horizontal certainty because deferential appellate review can inherently 
tolerate multiple inconsistent district court claim constructions. District 
courts might accept as persuasive the prior construction of another district 
court, but this is neither necessary nor certain. Moreover, horizontal 
certainty concerning how the market understands a given patent claim 
corresponds to precise boundary notice, and vertical certainty about how 
a given patent claim fares in a particular litigation corresponds with 
accurate boundary notice.152 Of these, precision in boundary notice 
would seem to be the greater economic and systemic value, 
corresponding as it does to greater ex ante certainty around which to make 
                                                                                                                     
 148. The other task is accuracy as to what the patent actually covers. If the supposed scope 
of patent rights is inaccurate (usually inaccurately broad), then the patent is invalid because the 
patentee has not fulfilled her end of the patent bargain. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying 
text. 
 149. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1173 
(2015). 
 150. Id. at 1287–88 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc., Dell Inc., EMC 
Corporation, Intel Corporation, SAP America, Inc., and SAS Institute Inc. in Support of Neither 
Party at 19, Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d 1272 (No. 2012–1014)). 
 151. Id. at 1288–89. 
 152. Cf. Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1, 42 (2012) (characterizing patent claims as proxies for the inventions they protect). 
Professor Oskar Liivak cogently explains that the requirement against claim indefiniteness—
corresponding here to the boundary notice function—ensures that claims are precise proxies for 
the invention, and the requirements for adequate disclosure in patents—corresponding here to the 
teaching function—ensure that the claims are accurate proxies. 
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investments, conduct research and development, and commercialize 
inventions. As a practical matter, however, it is an open empirical 
question whether the valuable certainty of precision merits the costly 
pursuit of accuracy.153 Further compounding the complexity of the 
empirical question, trial courts may themselves give deference to 
administrative findings by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) determinations of claim scope, an institutional relationship that 
is increasingly salient in view of the administrative post-grant patent 
reviews that the 2011 America Invents Act has created.154 
In grappling with this tension, fostering greater precision in the 
boundary notice of patent claims has commanded significant attention in 
both the literature and governmental efforts at reform, particularly in the 
twenty years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments.155 The Markman decision explained that patent claim 
construction is a “mongrel practice” combining legal and factual 
determinations,156 and the decision has since given rise to the ubiquitous 
and contentious Markman proceedings early in patent lawsuits.157  
In the literature, notable recent proposals to improve boundary notice 
include the development or greater use of technical dictionaries and 
USPTO-wide or examination art unit-wide glossaries to reduce the 
information costs that patent examiners must incur in evaluating 
applications for patent.158 Given the widely noted connection between 
                                                                                                                     
 153. This was a point that Judge Kathleen O’Malley’s dissent made in Lighting Ballast: the 
horizontal certainty purportedly offered by consistent claim construction through de novo 
appellate review requires finality (i.e., vertical certainty) in individual judgments. As a result, she 
argued, Lighting Ballast and its affirmation of Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), tend to undercut certainty, discourage settlement, and foster litigation 
through the final appeal. Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1296, 1310 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 154. For the seminal discussion of the institutional dimensions of deference as between 
courts and as between the Judiciary and the Executive on the questions of patent claim scope and 
uniformity, see generally Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy, supra note 93, at 1086–1101. 
 155. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 156. Id. at 377–78. 
 157. Though Markman itself does not require a particular timing for claim construction 
within the life cycle of patent litigation, courts have settled on a practice of construing claims after 
at least some fact discovery but still early enough to promote settlement in view of the issued 
claim construction ruling. See REBECCA N. EYRE, JOE S. CECIL & ERIC TOPOR, FED. JUD. CTR., 
Patent Claim Construction: A Survey of Federal District Court Judges 16–17 (Feb. 2008), 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/patclaim.pdf/$file/patclaim.pdf. The practice of premising 
claim construction on fact discovery is appropriate given the regularity with which courts “benefit 
from explanation of the technology and the instruction of treatises” and from “experts in the 
science or technology . . . in understanding the meaning and usage of a claim term.” Lighting 
Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1284–85. 
 158. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173, 
198 (2006). 
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boundary notice problems and patents on software-related inventions,159 
academic proposals have also focused on issues that are particularly 
important to software patent litigation, such as functional claiming,160 and 
on reforms that can disproportionately improve the quality of software 
patents, such as the USPTO’s new post-grant review powers under the 
America Invents Act.161 Notably, some of the most prominent of these 
discussions expressly stop short of abolishing software patents altogether 
and argue persuasively against industry-specific rules for patent 
protection.162 
Likewise in government, the White House Task Force on High-Tech 
Patent Issues recently directed an executive action toward “tightening 
functional claiming” in patents163 through, inter alia, the use of claim 
glossaries in the specifications of applications for patent.164 The 2011 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs From NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 391–94 (2014); Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through 
the Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 504–05 (2013) [hereinafter Rai, Improving 
(Software) Patent Quality]. 
 160. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the 
Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399, 1427–30 (2013); 
Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
905, 907 (2013) (noting that lawyers have a tendency to broaden claims as much as possible to 
acquire the strongest rights for their clients). 
 161. See, e.g., Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality, supra note 159, at 533–39.  
 162. E.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 157–58 (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 198 (2004); Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 622 
(2008). But see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1029–30 
(1990); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 110 (2011). 
 163. See THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: WHITE HOUSE 
TASK FORCE ON HIGH-TECH PATENT ISSUES (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
 164. See generally Glossary Initiative, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/glossary-initiative (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) (providing 
an overview of Glossary Initiative, a claim clarity training program). In fact, the USPTO’s 
exploration of requiring applicant glossaries predates the June 2013 White House announcement 
and has been part of a policy agenda directed toward patent quality more generally. See Request 
for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg. 2960–61 (Jan. 15, 2013). The 
response to these proposals, including the claim glossary requirement, has been mixed. Compare 
SUZANNE MICHEL, MICHAEL MEEHAN & WILLIAM G. JENKS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
COMMENTS OF GOOGLE INC. 7 (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/
swglossary_e_google_2013oct23.pdf (supporting glossary usage as a source of efficiency and 
improved claim clarity), and CHARLES DUAN, JULIE SAMUELS & DANIEL NAZER, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, COMMENTS OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION 2 (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/swglossary_a_eff_
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report of the Federal Trade Commission on aligning patent notice with 
competition policy also identified boundary notice difficulties rooted in 
functional claiming and other causes, such as variation of technical 
nomenclature and the patent system’s institutional preference for 
deferring the resolution of ambiguity in patent rights.165 
The vigor and scope of these debates and proposals reflect the high 
stakes of failure in boundary notice and emphasize the policy challenge 
that patent law must resolve if direct infringement continues to be 
mistakenly regarded as a strict liability offense whose principal 
justification resides in providing adequate notice to the public about the 
boundaries of patent rights. Conversely, a doctrine of direct infringement 
that properly accounts for the tortious intent of alleged infringers can 
offer both powerful new solutions to the current patent policy debate and 
a theoretical underpinning for existing proposals that are thus far 
pragmatic departures from the legal theory of patent infringement. 
II.  AN INTENTIONAL TORT THEORY OF INFRINGEMENT 
The thrust of Part I has been that the law of direct patent infringement 
is incorrect to conclude that disregarding any knowledge of a patent or 
any intent to infringe the patent is synonymous with strict liability, as this 
conclusion ignores an additional necessary inquiry: whether the alleged 
infringer intended to perform an act that constitutes infringement. Part II 
argues that the direct infringement doctrine should expressly inquire into 
this tortious intent and that such an inquiry follows from well-understood 
tort principles that connect purposive action to liability in tort. 
A.  Tort and the Exercise of Agency 
The exercise of agency through purposive action has increasingly 
become an explicitly theorized basis for the corrective justice that tort 
offers. In brief, the argument from purposive action in justifying tort 
liability regards the exercise of agency as a necessary condition,166 or at 
                                                                                                                     
2013oct24.pdf (same), with E-mail from Manny W. Schecter, Chief Patent Counsel for IBM 
Corp., & Alison D. Mortinger, Counsel of Strategy and Policy for IBM Corp., to 
SoftwareRoundtable2013@uspto.gov (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/
swglossary_e_ibm_2013oct03.pdf (expressing skepticism about glossary usage due to burdens of 
time and cost as well as the potential for downstream narrowing effects on claims), and Letter 
from Robert R. Sachs to Janet Gongola, Patent Reform Coordinator, U. S. Patent & Trademark 
Office (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/swglossary_f_sachs_2013
nov01.pdf (critiquing, inter alia, the potential in glossary usage for additional strategic behavior 
in patent prosecution). 
 165. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 80–86 (2011). 
 166. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 26 
(1995) (arguing that “the claims of corrective justice arise only with respect to losses occasioned 
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least a normatively appropriate one,167 to ensure that tort law adequately 
“secures favorable conditions for the exercise of our rational agency.”168 
These themes are apparent in the roles that intent and the appreciation of 
consequences have implicitly played in the historical development of tort 
law. 
1.  A Brief History of Tort 
Tort originated in two common law writs: the writ for the action of 
trespass and the writ for the action of trespass on the case.169 The two 
causes of action distinguished between forcible and direct injury 
(trespass) and indirect and consequential injury (case).170 Trespass came 
first,171 and its emphasis on forcible and direct injury reflects the criminal 
law origin of the action for trespass, which emerged to remedy actions 
“done by force and arms against the king’s peace.”172 
Though the writs for trespass and case focused on direct versus 
indirect causation of the plaintiff’s injury rather than on the defendant’s 
intent, intent was nevertheless important to the development of trespass 
and case as actions in tort. For example, the existing action of novel 
disseisin had been available when an intrusion onto land led to one’s 
                                                                                                                     
by human agency” notwithstanding specific disagreements about the relevant limitations, 
conditions, or importance of such agency); John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort 
Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 609 
(2005) (observing that “tort law, by articulating and enforcing relational duties, treats actors as 
agents who are responsible to others for the consequences of their actions”). 
 167. See Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q. REV. 530, 531, 539–41 (1988) 
(advancing an “outcome-responsibility” argument that choosing is a necessary act of agency, that 
exercising agency requires accepting the consequences of choices, and that normatively allocating 
liability for consequences is respectful of human agency). 
 168. Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2 J. ETHICS & 
SOC. PHIL. 1, 11 (2006). 
 169. See JOHN W. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF 
LIABILITY FOR CIVIL INJURIES 155 (2d ed. 1907). These actions came to be known simply as 
“trespass” and “case,” respectively. 
 170. See id. at 155–57. This conceptual focus on degrees of causation was altogether 
different from the later interest in the existence and degree of the tortfeasor’s intentions. Id. at 
157. 
 171. See 3 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: A 
PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 248–51 (1906) (tracing 
the emergence of trespass on the case from the earlier action for trespass through Parliament’s 
exercise of the 1285 Statute of Westminster II, which granted it the right to issue new writs and 
thereby create new legal rights in the King’s common law courts). 
 172. Id. at 229–30. 
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dispossession of the land173 or even to quiet enjoyment of it.174 The action 
required a competing claim of interest beyond mere intrusion, and 
making this distinction was an inquiry into the alleged wrongdoer’s 
intent.175 Such intent-based bifurcations also existed between criminal 
larceny and civil recovery of chattels, and between criminal felonious 
assault and minor civil batteries.176 
Once established, the writs for trespass and case only gradually shifted 
from a distinction of causal sequence to the modern distinction between 
conduct that is intentional and conduct that reflects a lower degree of 
purposive action, such as a negligent omissions.177 The shift, moreover, 
was not a one-to-one correspondence: a writ of trespass could lie even for 
negligent injuries so long as they were direct, whereas indirect injuries 
required an action on the case even if the injuries were intentionally 
inflicted.178 Regardless, from its earliest days, tort law has recognized in 
one way or another differentiable levels of intent reflecting purposive 
actions behind alleged bad acts and has translated those differences into 
legal distinctions. 
2.  Gradations of Tortious Intent 
The transition to modern intent-based tort law increasingly recognized 
two important principles. First, pure accident should generally not form 
the basis of liability, and at least some wrongful intent or some failure to 
exercise due care should be necessary.179 Second, the degree of liability 
imposed should be commensurate with the alleged wrongdoer’s degree 
of purposive action and her appreciation of the consequences of that 
action.180 Thus, liability ought to be mildest for conduct that is 
inadvertent (though still negligent by the relevant standard of care), 
harsher for conduct that disregards likely effects, harsher still for conduct 
that is intentional but without malice, and harshest for conduct that is 
maliciously intentional.181 
The importance of purposive action and appreciation of consequences 
is further evident in modern tort law’s definition of intent itself, which is 
acting to accomplish a result or believing that the result was substantially 
                                                                                                                     
 173. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 38 (2d ed. 1899). 
 174. See id. at 34–36 (discussing the medieval concept of “seisin” both as possession and 
enjoyment protected by the action for disseisin, or dispossession). 
 175. See STREET, supra note 171, at 227. 
 176. See id. at 240–44. 
 177. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 36–38 (1941). 
 178. See, e.g., Leame v. Bray, (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 724, 724–28 (K.B.), 3 East 593–96. 
 179. See PROSSER, supra note 177, at 39. 
 180. See id. at 39–40. 
 181. Id.  
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certain to follow.182 Intent, thus defined, informs all torts that require high 
purposive action and appreciation of consequences, including invasions 
of personhood such as battery,183 assault,184 and false imprisonment,185 as 
well as invasions of personal property such as trespass to chattels186 and 
conversion.187 This definition of intent also informs trespass to land,188 
the tort most often analogized to patent infringement.189 
3.  The Instructive Case of Trespass to Land 
Canonically, every form of trespass to land requires some level of 
intent. Unauthorized entry with intent creates liability even if the 
possessor of the land suffers no harm.190 Accordingly, mistake is no 
defense, and with one exception, even a reasonable contrary belief of law 
or fact does not excuse liability.191 Entry based upon a lower level of 
intent, such as reckless or negligent conduct, creates liability if it causes 
the possessor of the land a recognized harm.192 Likewise, an entry that is 
unintentional and non-negligent does not create liability even if it harms 
the possessor.193 
It is worth examining whether this common law framework reflects a 
normative principle that a given level of intent is necessary to justify a 
given level of liability, or merely that a given level of intent is sufficient 
to justify a given level of liability. If these different levels of intent are 
necessary to justify their respective levels of land trespass liability, then 
the most stringent liability, one imposed without regard to harm, may 
                                                                                                                     
 182. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The word 
‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote that the actor desires to cause 
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result 
from it.”), with PROSSER, supra note 177, at 40 (“A person intends a result when he acts for the 
purpose of accomplishing it, or believes that the result is substantially certain to follow from his 
act.”). 
 183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18. 
 184. Id. §§ 21–34. 
 185. Id. §§ 35–38, 40, 43–45. 
 186. Id. §§ 216–218, 221–222. 
 187. Id. §§ 222A–224, 226–227, 229–231, 233, 237. 
 188. Id. § 158. 
 189. See supra Subsection I.B.1 (discussing the trespass metaphor of patent infringement). 
See generally Mossoff, supra note 132 (critiquing on theoretical and empirical grounds the 
comparison of trespass to land with all encroachments upon the patent right). 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158. 
 191. Id. § 164. A mistake of law or fact may excuse liability when the conduct of the 
possessor induces such a mistake. Id. § 164 cmt. b.  
 192. Id. § 165. Liability under this principle also arises where the intruder is engaged in an 
abnormally dangerous activity. Id.  
 193. Id. § 166. This exemption from liability does not apply where the intruder is engaged in 
an abnormally dangerous activity. Id.  
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arise only from an intentional trespass to land; negligence or even 
recklessness will not do. Likewise, trespass that is both unintentional and 
accidental cannot support liability even where harm has occurred; 
recklessness or at least negligence is necessary. Conversely, if these 
different levels of intent are merely sufficient but not necessary to justify 
corresponding levels of liability, then diminished intent or even an 
absence of intent may support liability. 
The principles of common law trespass to land refute the latter view. 
Absence of intent cannot support any liability for trespass to land.194 Put 
another way, trespass to land is not a strict liability tort. Moreover, 
diminished intent such as recklessness or negligence cannot support 
liability without regard to harm.195 For trespass to land, therefore, the 
different levels of intent are not merely sufficient but necessary to justify 
a commensurate level of liability. In fact, as Professor William Prosser 
identifies, this commensurability principle largely holds for torts in 
general.196 
Importantly, the relevant inquiry for trespass to land at each level on 
this commensurability scale is neither whether there was an intent to 
violate the possessor’s rights nor whether there was even any knowledge 
that such rights exist, but simply whether there was an intent to perform 
the intrusive act: entering the land.197 So also for direct patent 
infringement, the tortious intent is to perform the infringing act: making, 
selling, or using the patented invention. 
The analogy between trespass to land and patent infringement has 
long persisted in the law as a descriptive matter,198 but the normative 
relevance of trespass to the patent system is an issue of ongoing debate. 
So although tort law’s principle of commensurability, between liability 
for the tort and the level of purposive intent animating the tort, is not 
limited to trespass, the prevalent application of trespass to patent 
infringement warrants discussion about the continuing suitability of this 
analogy. 
Even Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer implicitly accept, 
in their critique of patents for providing less clear notice than the real 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Professor Prosser stated the principle quite broadly that “regardless of the form of the 
action, there should be no liability for pure accident.” PROSSER, supra note 177, at 39. 
 197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 cmt. a. 
 198. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (explaining in the language of real property surveying that a patent claim “provides the 
metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers”); Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,742) (comparing an inventor to a farmer by stating that the inventor 
“holds a property in his invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock”); see 
supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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property trespass system would tolerate, that trespass doctrine is quite 
relevant to patent infringement. Their critique assumes that property 
rights such as rights to land present a useful economic benchmark for how 
property rights, especially the right to exclude others, ought to 
function.199 Thus, their argument finding notice failure in patents is not 
that real property has no lessons for the patent system.200 In fact, as to 
liability, they see a “crucial” similarity between the two legal regimes in 
disregarding knowledge or intent for determining liability.201 
Yet this comparison, correct so far as it goes, simply restates the 
conventional strict liability view of patent infringement202 while ignoring 
the tortious intent of an alleged infringer—or of an alleged trespasser.203 
Instead, Professors Bessen and Meurer conclude that the patent system is 
not specific enough in delineating boundaries to justify property rights 
akin to those that guard against trespass to land.204 
There is some force to the counterargument that Professors Bessen 
and Meurer’s indeterminacy critique is unduly reductive of real property, 
e.g., their contrast between the scope of real property rights and the scope 
of patent rights.205 The full scope of a right in real property consists of 
temporal and functional boundaries in addition to physical ones, and the 
scope of an estate in real property is not captured solely, or even 
primarily, by a fence around land.206 Rather, defining rights of 
                                                                                                                     
 199. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 126, at 29–45 (drawing comparisons 
between the respective economics of tangible property rights and patent rights). 
 200. See id. at 30 (asserting that “the economics of property has valuable lessons for the 
economics of patents”). 
 201. Professors Bessen and Meurer argue that “[a] trespasser is still liable regardless of 
whether she was mistaken about a property line or took care to avoid trespass. Similarly a 
technology-adopter is still liable for patent infringement regardless of whether she independently 
invented or made a good-faith effort to avoid intruding on someone’s patent rights.” Id. at 31. 
 202. See supra Subsections I.A.1–2. 
 203. As previously discussed, there is no trespass to land where the unauthorized entry was 
unintentional and non-negligent. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 204. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 126, at 46–72. 
 205. Professors Bessen and Meurer argue: 
The scope of tangible property is relatively easy to define in terms of physical 
attributes. For example, the scope of land rights is defined by a boundary traced 
on the earth. Defining the scope of patent rights is extremely difficult, because it 
is hard to draw a boundary around an idea. 
Id. at 32. Similarly, Professor Tun-Jen Chiang has found the boundaries of patent rights lacking 
in clarity by comparison to the stability of fences around real property. See Tun-Jen Chiang, 
Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 527–31 (2010). 
 206. See Mossoff, supra note 132, at 1698–99. Professor Adam Mossoff argues that 
comparing patent indeterminacy to land trespass alone is a logical fallacy in the conceptual sense, 
as it commits a category mistake. See id. at 1696–1704. He adds that the supposed clarity of notice 
as a bulwark against trespass to land is also unverified as an empirical matter. See id. at 1704–10. 
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possession, use, disposition, and future interests, etc., is the greater task 
of real property, and in that exercise, construing the terms of wills, deeds, 
and similar documents is much like construing patent claims.207 Yet, this 
counterargument does little more than reduce the scope of patent 
indeterminacy to be evaluated, leaving open a more limited analogical 
role for trespass. Trespass has just such a role to play as to the specific 
doctrine of direct patent infringement.208 In fact, real property offers a 
variety of examples where tortious intent is necessary to create liability 
for trespass to land.209 
Perhaps the simplest case of non-trespass for inadequate tortious 
intent is falling by accident onto another’s land. For example, in 
Puchlopek v. Portsmouth Power Co.,210 a schoolboy died when he slipped 
and his arm entered between two pickets of the fence that enclosed a 
transformer station, coming in contact with a high-voltage wire.211 
Though the jury at trial accepted the power station’s defense that the boy 
was a trespasser, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire disagreed, 
finding that the boy’s arm entered onto the power station’s land 
involuntarily, which could not constitute trespass.212 Quite apart from 
whether the boy intended to commit trespass or knew who owned the 
power station, the court focused on the simple fact that he had not 
intended to enter the land.213 
Trespass also fails where a third party physically forces the would-be 
trespasser to either enter the land or remain there. Thus, in Hayes v. 
Bushey,214 the Supreme Court of Maine held that a truck driver who had 
left the highway and crashed into a building was not liable because he 
had been driving lawfully with due care, and another driver’s car forced 
him off the road.215 Similarly, in Feiges v. Racine Dry Goods Co.,216 the 
owner of a dry goods store had been unable to leave the building to which 
his lease was due to expire because a picket line of striking employees 
had blocked all entries and exits.217 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See Mossoff, supra note 132, at 1699–1700. 
 208. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 131, at 40 (arguing that rather than generalizing up to the 
level of estate boundaries as Professor Mossoff suggests, the patent indeterminacy debate should 
“ask what subsidiary doctrine of patent law is commensurate in analytical scope with the doctrine 
of trespass in real property” and proposing direct patent infringement as that subsidiary doctrine). 
 209. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
 210. 136 A. 259 (N.H. 1926). 
 211. Id. at 259. 
 212. Id. at 260. 
 213. Id. 
 214.  196 A.2d 823 (Me. 1964). 
 215. Id. at 826. 
 216. 285 N.W. 799 (Wis. 1939).  
 217. Id. at 799. 
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found no trespass, holding that although the store owner had physically 
remained past his permission to do so, he had no intent to stay and the 
“stress of circumstances” prevented him from leaving.218 
These cases reflect settled common law property principles requiring 
an intent to enter land for trespass liability to arise.219 Just as an action for 
trespass protects a real property right against a direct invasion of the 
underlying subject of the right (the land), an action for direct infringement 
also protects a patent right from direct invasion of the underlying subject 
of that right (the invention). In operationalizing that analogous role, the 
intentional tort theory of infringement draws much from the history and 
principles of trespass to land.220 
Though largely ignored and untheorized by patent law, the tortious 
intent inquiry also comports with the language of the Patent Act and 
provides a potential resolution for an important practical debate currently 
taking place in patent infringement law. 
B.  Tortious Intent in Patent Infringement 
However well grounded the doctrine of tortious intent may be in 
common law tort principles, it must also rest on the statutory foundations 
of the U.S. patent system. In fact, not only does the text of the direct 
patent infringement statute support an inquiry into tortious intent, but 
federal appellate case law on statutory interpretation confirms the textual 
argument. 
1.  The Statutory Basis for Tortious Intent 
The Patent Act regards as a direct infringer “whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented 
invention during the term of the patent therefor.”221 
The use of four transitive verbs—“makes,” “uses,” “offers,” and 
“sells”—to specify the set of infringing actions is consistent with 
requiring purposive action on the part of an alleged infringer. The level 
of purpose may be as minimal as seeking to accomplish the natural result 
of the act itself or to believe that such a result is substantially certain to 
follow, e.g., an alleged infringer must seek to accomplish the result of 
selling something: the sale of the thing. Whether the alleged infringer was 
additionally mistaken or wholly ignorant of the act’s legal consequences 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for determining liability. Indeed, this 
                                                                                                                     
 218. Id. at 801–02. 
 219. See supra Subsections II.A.1–3. 
 220. See supra Section II.A. 
 221. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
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is the very conception of intent in tort law.222 
As a matter of statutory construction, federal courts have similarly 
read the use of transitive verbs in statutes as calling for purposive action. 
In Cole v. United States Attorney General,223 for example, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of a Jamaican 
citizen’s petition for asylum,224 finding that his state criminal conviction 
in South Carolina was a disqualifying “crime of violence” for deportation 
purposes.225 Following the Supreme Court’s instruction in Leocal v. 
Ashcroft226 that a crime of violence requires a mens rea greater than mere 
negligence,227 the court in Cole found that the relevant South Carolina 
statute making it “unlawful for a person to present or point at another 
person a loaded or unloaded firearm”228 suffices because the transitive 
verb “presenting” refers to “‘showing or displaying a firearm in a 
threatening or menacing manner’ and hence requires an intentional mens 
rea.”229 
Similarly, in United States v. Hill,230 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of criminal charges of aiding and 
abetting a gambling enterprise, finding that the so-called “illegal 
gambling business” statute231 may support felony accomplice liability if, 
but only if, the aider and abettor demonstrates adequate intent.232 
Following its own instruction in United States v. Bryant233 that aiding and 
abetting as a general matter requires specific criminal intent,234 the court 
in Hill found an appropriate intent requirement in the statute’s “six 
transitive verbs—‘conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or 
owns’”—denoting the actions that the accomplice’s own actions must 
have endorsed to be liable.235 
                                                                                                                     
 222. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 223. 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 224. Id. at 520.  
 225. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining a “crime of violence”). 
 226. 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 227. Id. at 9–11. 
 228. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16–23–410 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 229. 712 F.3d at 528 (quoting In re Spencer R., 692 S.E.2d 569, 572 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010)). 
More precisely, Cole accepted the South Carolina appellate court’s interpretation of the statute 
because the Eleventh Circuit independently found that “this interpretation of the active verb is 
consistent” with more general state supreme court precedent about the elements of the state 
statute. Id. 
 230. 55 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 231. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012). 
 232. Hill, 55 F.3d at 1198–99. 
 233. 461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972).  
 234. Id. at 920. 
 235. 55 F.3d at 1202 (parsing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1955). 
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The Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa v. United States236 elaborated 
on this thread of statutory construction, taking it as implicit that a 
transitive verb in statutory text calls for purposive action and finding 
further that an adverb of intentionality that modifies such a verb also 
modifies both the object of the verb and limitations on the object.237 The 
defendant had been convicted under the federal aggravated identity theft 
statute, which holds liable anyone who “knowingly transfers, possesses, 
or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person.”238 However, the Government had not proven or found it 
necessary to prove the defendant’s knowledge that the means of 
identification belonged to another person.239 Eight members of the Court, 
including Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurring in 
pertinent part, reversed the conviction and agreed that the statute’s mens 
rea requirement extended not only to the purposive actions denoted by 
the transitive verbs (“transfers,” “possesses,” and “uses”), but also to the 
object of those verbs (“means of identification”) and to the modifier of 
that object (“of another person”).240 Justice Alito, for his part, limited his 
concurrence only to reject an inflexible rule of construction whereby the 
mens rea requirements of federal criminal statutes might routinely apply 
to every element of an offense.241 
It seems uncontroversial as a general matter of construction, therefore, 
that the use of transitive verbs in the direct patent infringement statute 
calls for purposive action on the part of the alleged infringer and that the 
requisite level of purpose be at the minimal standard of tortious intent: to 
seek to accomplish a making, an offering, a selling, or a using. 
2.  The Common Law Basis for Tortious Intent 
The widespread acceptance of direct infringement as a strict liability 
offense is problematic because the strict liability designation originally 
arose as an inference from what direct infringement does not require—
intent to infringe, knowledge of the patent, and so on—but the 
designation has since become a starting premise for the infringement 
determination itself.242 Yet strict liability is itself an incomplete inference 
and therefore an inapt premise, as it ignores an important element of 
determining direct patent infringement: whether there is an intent to 
                                                                                                                     
 236. 556 U.S. 646 (2009). 
 237. Id. at 650–52. 
 238. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 239. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 648. 
 240. See id. at 650–54; id. at 657 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 241. Id. at 659 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 242. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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perform the act that constitutes infringement. 
The basis for inquiring into an alleged infringer’s intent to perform 
such actions already exists implicitly in the direct infringement 
jurisprudence, in cases dating as far back as the early twentieth century. 
In Brothers v. United States,243 for example, the plaintiff asserted a patent 
on improvements in cableways on gravity anchors whereby the towers 
connecting the cables would desirably yield or tilt.244 During construction 
of the Panama Canal, the U.S. government had built rigid cableway 
towers that happened to yield or tilt under the stress of tightened cables, 
and the patentee argued that this was infringement.245 The U.S. Court of 
Claims found noninfringement, however, because the government’s 
towers were rigid by design, and unintended mechanical behavior in the 
towers that happened to coincide with the patented invention was not 
infringement.246  
Likewise, in Pratt v. United States,247 the plaintiff asserted a patent on 
a mechanism for hooking an airplane in flight to a stationary arresting 
apparatus and thereby gradually slowing the airplane’s speed to land it in 
very short distance.248 The U.S. government employed a mechanism on 
its naval aircraft carriers designed for hooking an airplane that had 
already landed on the deck and thereby slowing only its forward progress, 
though at times the government’s mechanism did happen to hook an 
airplane while the airplane was still technically in flight; on this basis, the 
patentee argued infringement.249 The Court of Claims again found 
noninfringement, holding that if a device was constructed and intended 
to operate on a different principle than what the patent involved and 
intended, then inadvertent or unskillful operation that happened to 
coincide with the patented invention was not infringement.250 In both 
cases, the court found direct noninfringement, not because the defendant 
was unaware of the patent or because it did not intend to infringe, but 
because it did not intend to perform the underlying actions that 
constituted infringement. 
This basis for direct noninfringement has survived into modern 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence as well. In Pall Corp. v. Hemasure,251 for 
example, plaintiff Pall Corporation asserted a patent on a venting system 
                                                                                                                     
 243. 52 Ct. Cl. 462 (1917). 
 244. Id. at 466. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. 43 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. Cl. 1942).  
 248. Id. at 461, 475. 
 249. Id. at 475–76. 
 250. Id. 
 251. 181 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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for filtering leukocytes from blood using porous membranes to prevent 
the passage of air into a filtration chamber.252 Defendant Hemasure’s 
filtration system contained similar porous membranes, but Hemasure did 
not intend these membranes to filter air from blood.253 Accordingly, the 
court held that the divergent purpose of the membrane precluded liability 
for direct infringement even if the accused system appeared literally to 
infringe.254 Conversely, in Centillion Data Systems v. Qwest 
Communications,255 plaintiff Centillion asserted a patent on a system for 
a service provider to gather, process, and deliver information to a 
customer.256 Defendant Qwest argued that there was no directly 
infringing “use” of the patented system by accepting customer queries 
and performing the back-end processing itself, rather than allowing 
customers to use the entire system autonomously.257 The court, however, 
found direct infringement, reasoning that a customer’s engagement of the 
system by creating a query causes the remainder of the system to “act for 
its intended purpose” and therefore is enough to create a directly 
infringing use.258 In these modern cases, too, the finding of direct 
infringement (or not) has turned on whether the alleged infringer’s 
conduct, whether by designing toward or away from a particular purpose, 
reflected an intent to perform the actions that constitute infringement.259 
Importantly, the findings in these cases concerning what the patented 
inventions were actually designed to accomplish are examples of 
purposive construction in evaluating the scope of patent rights. This 
approach to construction is altogether appropriate, for just as the tortious 
intent refers to that purposive action of the alleged infringer that violates 
the patent, purposive construction of the patent itself refers to what 
invention the inventor intended for the patent to protect.260 
Despite this implicit role for tortious intent in direct patent 
infringement—quite apart from knowledge of a patent or intent to 
infringe it—courts and commentators alike have mistakenly persisted in 
describing direct patent infringement as a strict liability offense.261 The 
                                                                                                                     
 252. Id. at 1307–08. 
 253. Id. at 1310–11. 
 254. Id. at 1312. 
 255. 631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 256. Id. at 1281. 
 257. Id. at 1284–85. 
 258. Id. at 1285. 
 259. See, e.g., MLMC, Ltd. v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 464, 475 (D. Del. 
2002) (discussing the act of intentionally designing away from another patent as evidence of non-
infringement). 
 260. See infra Subsection III.E.2. 
 261. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Potter Voice 
Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 882, 885 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting In re Seagate, 497 
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mistaken strict liability conception, in turn, has had important 
consequences for the role of indeterminacy and notice in the patent 
system. 
III.  TOWARD A NEW VIEW OF DIRECT INFRINGEMENT 
The focus of Part II has been to fill the doctrinal gap identified in Part 
I regarding direct patent infringement by defining a doctrine of tortious 
intent that connects purposive action to tort liability, particularly in the 
unresolved controversy over divided infringement. Part III now places 
the doctrine of tortious intent in context with larger open questions about 
patent infringement and identifies several important benefits that this 
doctrine offers in the ongoing patent policy debate. 
A.  Direct Infringement as an Intentional Tort 
The mistaken view that direct patent infringement is a strict liability 
tort and the identification of a precisely defined inquiry into the purposive 
actions of the alleged infringer point to a straightforward—though 
perhaps dissonant—conclusion. The basic act of infringing a patent is 
best understood as an intentional tort. 
It has been necessary to refer separately to an underlying tortious 
intent because patent law separately imposes penalties for infringement 
that stems from knowledge or reckless ignorance262 of legal rights or an 
intent to infringe, whether through willful infringement263 or through 
induced or contributory infringement.264 Where these particular forms of 
knowledge or intent are unnecessary, patent law has declared strict 
liability.265 Yet the definition of intent in the tort law sense is modest 
enough to fit even what little space remains for purposive action when all 
other requirements of willfulness, recklessness, or knowledge are gone. 
In direct patent infringement, as in the rest of tort law, intent denotes only 
“that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes 
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”266 
                                                                                                                     
F.3d 1360); Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 487, 510 (M.D. 
Pa. 2010).     
 262. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (discussing the willful infringement 
standard, which previously required actual knowledge or notice of the patent as articulated by 
Underwater Devices); supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing the current Seagate 
standard, which permits a finding of willfulness based on recklessness on the part of the infringer).  
 263. See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text (discussing the role of knowledge and 
intent in willful infringement). 
 264. See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text (discussing the role of knowledge and 
intent in induced infringement and contributory infringement). 
 265. See supra Subsection I.A.1 (discussing what was historically meant by a “strict 
liability” view of patent infringement). 
 266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see supra notes 182–
89 and accompanying text. 
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This elementary and overlooked view of intent offers theoretical 
support for at least four important doctrinal entry points into the debate 
over boundary notice in the patent system. A first entry point is the need 
to differentiate among makers, sellers, and users of inventions that turn 
out to be patented. This is an economically significant distinction to make 
when evaluating and allocating the costs and risks associated with 
avoiding infringement, but it is a distinction for which patent law 
currently offers no principled approach. A second entry point is the recent 
jurisprudential shift in the doctrine of inherency away from traditional 
requirements of recognition of the conduct in question, with regard to 
prior art anticipation as well as to infringement. A third entry point is the 
challenge of divided infringement, which the Supreme Court confronted 
but left ultimately unresolved in its October 2014 Term. A fourth entry 
point is the proper approach to ex post claim construction by courts once 
a patent owner has asserted its rights against alleged infringers, 
particularly those whose conduct may reside in a zone of uncertainty that 
is outside the scope of the patented invention but inside the scope of the 
patent claim language. 
B.  Makers vs. Sellers vs. Users 
In some respects, treating direct infringement as an intentional tort 
makes little immediate difference; in other respects, considerable 
difference. And that difference is precisely the point. 
1.  Intent to Make an Invention 
For technology implementers acting in a variety of economic 
circumstances, the act of making an invention is already purposive. 
Among simple articles of manufacture, for example, where a patent 
covers a chair comprising four legs, a seat, and a back, it is unlikely that 
a manufacturer of stools that comprise four legs and a seat will possess 
the tortious intent to infringe the patent. To do so, the manufacturer would 
have to set out to build a stool and unintentionally build a chair. To be 
sure, more complicated facts abound, particularly in industries that 
operate at microscale and nanoscale. Such manufacturing operations 
may, indeed, run afoul of patents either despite designs to the contrary or 
simply from ignorance. Recent case law addressing such truly inadvertent 
infringement is discussed in detail later in this Article.267 In the main, 
however, the deliberate design, antecedent detail, and often high fixed 
cost of establishing manufacturing operations suggest that an entity will 
usually have the tortious intent to make an invention that does, or does 
not, infringe a patent. The doctrine of tortious intent does little to disrupt 
this state of affairs. 
                                                                                                                     
 267. See infra Subsection III.C.3. 
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2.  Intent to Sell an Invention 
Sales and offers for sale are a less straightforward case. The work of 
sellers, like that of manufacturers, is undoubtedly purposive at the basic 
level of intending to sell something. Depending on the complexity of the 
good or service being sold, however, there may or may not be tortious 
intent with specific regard to a particular patented invention. For 
example, the stool manufacturer’s distributor surely knows that the goods 
she is selling are stools rather than chairs. Yet a smartphone 
manufacturer’s distributor may well be unaware that the goods she is 
selling include chipsets that are based on a reduced instruction set 
computing (RISC) architecture.268 If so, she would lack the tortious intent 
to sell such a chipset and would not be liable for infringing a patent that 
covered such chipsets. Notably, an upstream component vendor that sold 
chipsets to the smartphone manufacturer likely would not be so ignorant 
in this regard. Hence, the manufacturer would likely possess the tortious 
intent to sell and be liable for infringement, all else equal. This practical 
importance of an actor’s position in the stream of commerce is a sensible 
result of the doctrine of tortious intent because it tends to create liability 
among those actors who are well positioned at lowest cost to avoid 
infringement269 and tends to alleviate the risk of liability among those 
actors who are not so well positioned or for whom the cost of informing 
themselves of technical details are impractically higher in light of their 
downstream commercial and nontechnical roles as, for example, 
distributors or retailers. 
3.  Intent to Use an Invention 
Using is the case for which the doctrine of tortious intent offers the 
most powerful flexibility as a doctrinal lever. In part this is because what 
constitutes use in patent law is multiform. One important set of users for 
                                                                                                                     
 268. Rachel Courtland, The Battle Between ARM and Intel Gets Real, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 
25, 2012, 16:09 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/processors/the-battle-between-
arm-and-intel-gets-real. 
 269. This conclusion rests upon a large body of law and economics literature regarding the 
allocation of risk and cost to those whose activities give rise to relevant accidents and harms 
“[o]nly if it can clearly be shown that injurers could have cheaply avoided the loss.” See Guido 
Calabresi, Torts—The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 519 (1978). To put the 
principle more formally, “economic efficiency asks for that combination of entitlements to engage 
in risky activities and to be free from harm from risky activities which will most likely lead to the 
lowest sum of accident costs and of costs of avoiding accidents.” Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972) (emphasis added). Importantly, this least-cost-avoidance 
principle does not systematically foreordain liability for any one class of parties, whether it be the 
injurer or the injured, for “[a]s often as not, the best decision maker is the victim.” Guido 
Calabresi, Civil Recourse Theory’s Reductionism, 88 IND. L.J. 449, 456 (2013). 
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whom tortious intent is a particularly timely doctrinal innovation is end 
users. End users, who may be broadly understood as the eventual and 
ultimate consumers of an integrated technology, have been exposed to 
patent infringement liability at various points in U.S. history. One 
example is the assertion of dormant agricultural patents against farmers 
during Reconstruction.270 Another example is the threat by patent lawyer 
George Selden, who held a broad patent on automobiles generally, 
against would-be customers of the Ford Motor Company that to purchase 
a Model T was to “[b]uy a [l]awsuit.”271 End users remain equally 
important in the current debate over patent litigation and patent notice, 
particularly in cases where patent owners assert their rights against 
allegedly infringing manufacturers (who are accused of making the 
patented invention), against allegedly infringing distributors and retailers 
(who are accused of selling the patented invention), and finally against 
customers at the end of the stream of commerce (who are accused of using 
the patented invention).272 
Among the variety of proposals aimed at empowering end users in the 
face of such patent assertions, two of note include targeted fee shifting 
for prevailing end users273 and an explicit customer-suit exception.274 Fee 
shifting is a pragmatic departure from the usual American Rule requiring 
each party to pay its own way.275 Alternatively, the current customer-suit 
exception, a procedural case management mechanism, is a relatively 
obscure common law practice of staying end user litigation until the 
courts have resolved upstream lawsuits against the accused 
manufacturer.276 
By comparison, the doctrine of tortious intent offers a direct 
substantive reply to such end user litigation practices, whatever their 
                                                                                                                     
 270. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2007). 
 271. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 888–90, 890 n.217 (1990). 
 272. Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 
1443–44 (2014) (discussing threatened and actual litigation by patent assertion entities against 
end users). Professor Gaia Bernstein argues that patent owners in such cases have no need to 
cultivate relationships with customers and so are not deterred from asserting their rights in ways 
that practicing patent owners would be. Id. at 1455–56. This, together with a large pool of potential 
alleged infringers and a high likelihood of settling rather than exploring the merits of a litigation 
at great cost, has led to a proliferation of economically inefficient end user litigation. Id. at 1447, 
1470 & n.175. 
 273. Id. at 1450. 
 274. Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1614 (2013). 
 275. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1575–76 (1993). 
 276. See, e.g., Rates Tech. Inc. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., No. 94 Civ. 9297 (DC), 1995 WL 438954, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995). 
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prevalence or severity may be as an empirical matter. Whereas 
manufacturers by virtue of their direct purposive engagement with the 
making of technologies are likely to possess the tortious intent to make, 
and whereas sellers may or may not possess the tortious intent to sell 
depending on their position in the stream of commerce, end users are 
more unlikely than any other economic actors to possess the tortious 
intent to use the kinds of highly integrated inventions that pose the 
greatest problems of notice. Accordingly, end users’ lack of tortious 
intent in such cases would substantively shield them from liability for the 
intentional tort of direct patent infringement. 
C.  Inherency and the Anticipation–Infringement Symmetry 
Second, with respect to inherency, the doctrine of tortious intent 
provides a potential resolution for the Federal Circuit’s controversial 
emerging jurisprudence in the doctrines of both anticipation and 
infringement. 
1.  The Anticipation Doctrine 
Anticipation is a legal conclusion that a given invention is not novel 
because the invention was previously patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use.277 Regardless of the source of anticipation, 
the features of the invention as presently claimed must all be present in a 
single source—the “all elements rule”—for novelty to be destroyed.278 If 
the elements of the invention are dispersed over two or more prior 
sources, then the nonobviousness requirement is the appropriate standard 
for evaluating whether the invention is patentable.279 The all elements 
rule also governs infringement such that an accused device must contain 
every limitation of an asserted patent claim, either literally or 
equivalently, to infringe the claim.280 As this shared use of the all 
elements rule reflects, U.S. patent law has long recognized a symmetry 
between anticipation and infringement.281 The usual articulation of this 
symmetry is “[t]hat which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if 
                                                                                                                     
 277. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  
 278. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 279. See 35 U.S.C. § 103; Alfredo De La Rosa, A Hard Pill to Swallow: Does Schering v. 
Geneva Endanger Innovation Within the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 37, 44 (2007). 
 280. TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2008).  
 281. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(finding it “well established for over a century that the same test must be used for both 
infringement and anticipation”). 
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earlier.”282  
2.  The Inherency Doctrine 
Yet the all elements rule is not the end of the story. To it, the courts 
have added the common law principle of inherency, which holds that 
although some necessary element may not expressly be identified, the law 
may still consider the element to be present if it is inherent in the given 
technology.283 For example in Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,284 the Federal Circuit found inherent anticipation 
and so invalidated a patent on an anhydrate crystal formulation of a drug 
for treating hypertension and benign prostatic hyperplasia.285 A third 
party not involved in the litigation had previously sold the compound in 
the United States, and although none of the parties to those transactions 
had known which particular anhydrate crystal they were transacting at the 
time, the court found that the product sold had inherently possessed each 
of the limitations of the asserted patent claim.286 Accordingly, the sales 
anticipated the patented invention, and the asserted claim was invalid.287 
Importantly, the doctrine of inherency traditionally included a 
requirement that an inherent element could contribute to anticipation only 
if people of ordinary skill in the art know or appreciate the inherent 
element.288 For example in Tilghman v. Proctor,289 the Supreme Court 
upheld a patent on a process for separating natural fats into fatty acids 
and glycerine by applying high temperature and high heat to a mixture of 
natural fats and water.290 An earlier steam cylinder had been in use that 
happened to subject tallow, which was used to lubricate the piston, to a 
similar combination of high temperature and high heat and thus produced 
some quantities of fatty acids and glycerine as incidental waste 
products.291 The Court declined to find inherency, explaining that the 
                                                                                                                     
 282. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 21 F. 319, 321 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884), aff’d, 129 U.S. 530, 
537 (1889). 
 283. See Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268–69 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (discussing the weight given to the inherency doctrine when determining anticipation under 
35 U.S.C. § 102). 
 284. 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 285. Id. at 1316, 1319. 
 286. Id. at 1317, 1319. 
 287. Id. at 1319. 
 288. Cont’l Can, 948 F.2d at 1268 (requiring that the inherent element “would be so 
recognized by persons of ordinary skill”). As to what is actually inherent, rather than what is 
merely probabilistic, the doctrine also requires that “the missing descriptive matter is necessarily 
present in the thing described in the reference.” Id. 
 289. 102 U.S. 707 (1880).  
 290. Id. at 709, 734. 
 291. Id. at 710–11. 
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prior accidental effects that coincided with the patent claims were “never 
fully understood” and occurred “accidentally and unwittingly . . . without 
exciting attention.”292 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a finding of 
anticipation would be “absurd.”293 
Similarly, in Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,294 
the Supreme Court upheld a patent on an improvement to the field of 
Fourdrinier paper-making machines.295 Prior to the patented invention, 
such machines began to produce defective paper when the rolling woven 
mesh belt on which the paper was formed moved faster than 500 feet per 
minute.296 Inventor William Eibel determined that the reason for this 
defect was that the mesh belt, known as the wire, was moving more 
quickly than the raw paper stock, leading to turbulence and rippling in 
the stock itself.297 Eibel solved this problem by sharply raising the slope 
of the wire and thus increasing the downward speed of the stock by the 
additional gravitational force so that the wire and stock would move at 
roughly equal speeds, allowing for better paper and faster production 
speeds.298 The validity of the patent was challenged based on an earlier 
patent to inventors Barrett and Horne whose invention had similarly 
raised the slope of the wire for water drainage-related purposes, and so 
the challenger argued accordingly that the earlier patent anticipated 
Eibel’s patent regardless of “whether Barrett and Horne perceived the 
advantage of speeding up the stock to an equality with the wire, yet the 
necessary effect of their devices was to achieve that result.”299 The Court, 
citing Tilghman, reiterated the knowledge requirement for inherency that 
“accidental results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute 
anticipation.”300  
3.  The Role of Tortious Intent 
These historical affirmations—that knowledge, recognition, or 
appreciation of a putatively inherent element in the prior art are necessary 
to create anticipation and destroy novelty—have also been a doctrinal 
bulwark against creating liability for truly inadvertent infringement based 
on a theory of inherency. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
                                                                                                                     
 292. Id. at 711–12. 
 293. Id. at 712. 
 294. 261 U.S. 45 (1923). 
 295. Id. at 46, 69. 
 296. Id. at 52. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 52, 55. 
 299. Id. at 66. 
 300. Id. 
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Corp.,301 however, the Federal Circuit dramatically enlarged the scope of 
inherent anticipation.302 As a result, the Federal Circuit’s decision has 
created the symmetric potential for inherent infringement as well. 
The SmithKline decision invalidated SmithKline’s patent on 
crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride (PHC) hemihydrate, one of a class 
of chemical compounds invented during the late 1970s and possessing 
antidepressant properties.303 An earlier form of the paroxetine salt had 
been an anhydrate lacking any bound water molecules, whereas the more 
stable hemihydrate comprised PHC crystals with one water molecule for 
every two PHC molecules.304 The court held that the prior art anhydrate 
inherently anticipated the patented hemihydrate because producing the 
anhydrate necessarily produced trace amounts of hemihydrate.305 The 
court found it irrelevant that these trace amounts were not detectable at 
the time306 and were therefore incapable of being appreciated by those of 
ordinary skill in the art. Not coincidentally, the court in SmithKline also 
found that Apotex, by producing such trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate 
through its production of prior art PHC anhydrate, would have infringed 
SmithKline’s patent.307 However, in view of the court’s inherent 
anticipation finding, the finding of infringement carried no liability.308 
The SmithKline decision has potentially profound ramifications for 
the patent notice debate. By removing the inherency doctrine’s historical 
sine qua non of knowledge, recognition, or appreciation, the Federal 
Circuit has bilaterally distorted the incentive structure underlying the 
patent system. On the one hand, because qualities inherent in a 
technology that were unappreciated even by those having ordinary skill 
in that technology may now create anticipation and defeat novelty, the 
ability of innovators to secure patent protection is weaker.309 No less 
important, however, is the implicit newfound ability of patent owners to 
impose infringement liability on a theory of inherent infringement against 
                                                                                                                     
 301. 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
 302. Id. at 1329 (granting petitions for rehearing en banc only for the limited purpose of 
vacating the original opinion on the issue of experimental use). The dissent expressed concern 
“that the court has preserved the [panel] opinion’s enlargement of the ground of invalidity called 
‘inherent anticipation.’” Id. (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 303. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir.), aff’d 
en banc, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 1341–42. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 1346. 
 308. Id. at 1346–47. 
 309. See, e.g., De La Rosa, supra note 279, at 40–42, 48 (arguing that the broader scope of 
the inherent anticipation doctrine in SmithKline stands to impede the development by 
pharmaceutical companies of in vivo metabolites and other biological compositions). 
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those whose conduct inadvertently constitutes practicing the patented 
invention. This is strict liability patent infringement in the true sense, and 
because no appreciation of the physical consequences of one’s conduct is 
necessary for a finding of inherent infringement, the boundary notice 
function of patents and the opportunity to avoid infringement in this 
regime are wholly meaningless. 
The doctrine of tortious intent provides a cure for this jurisprudential 
shift as well. Because tortious intent requires purposive action on the part 
of an alleged infringer310 and because purposive action is not possible 
without knowledge or appreciation of the underlying consequences of 
one’s actions,311 the intentional nature of the direct infringement tort 
proposed here provides a natural check against such an unconstrained 
view of inherency, either for anticipation or for direct infringement.312 
D.  Divided Infringement 
Third, on the issue of divided infringement, recent guidance from the 
Supreme Court has created the need for a coherent theoretical basis for 
ascribing intent to alleged infringers. 
1.  Akamai and the Single-Entity Rule 
Before the Federal Circuit reheard Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai 
Technologies, Inc.,313 the Court rejected the doctrine that that an alleged 
infringer who performs only some of the steps of a patented method while 
encouraging another to perform the remaining steps may be liable for 
induced infringement even if no one was liable for an underlying direct 
infringement.314 The Federal Circuit had originally held en banc that such 
inducement liability could attach because inducement does not require 
that the underlying direct infringement create liability, only that direct 
infringement occurred: to satisfy this limited latter condition, it is enough 
                                                                                                                     
 310. See supra Section II.B (elucidating the operation of the doctrine of relevant intent in 
patent infringement). 
 311. See supra notes 182–89 and accompanying text (discussing the long-understood 
relationship between appreciation of the physical consequences of one’s conduct and purposive 
action in the sense of intent). 
 312. But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 381–
82 (2005) (advancing a “public benefit” theory of inherency that foundationally rejects the 
knowledge or appreciation requirement in traditional inherency doctrine and, accordingly, 
commends the Federal Circuit’s turn in SmithKline). Professors Burk and Lemley follow their 
argument as to anticipation to its conclusion in infringement, acknowledging that direct patent 
infringement will, indeed, be a true strict liability offense. Id. at 401 n.150. 
 313. 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), remanded for reh’g en banc, 797 F.3d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(en banc).  
 314. Id. at 2115. 
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that the related parties perform all the steps of the patented method.315 
Though the en banc Federal Circuit did not originally address direct 
infringement liability where the infringement is divided among different 
actors acting at arm’s length,316 two dissents from that opinion argued 
that the issue cannot be avoided because direct and induced infringement 
are not separable in the way that the majority proposed.317 Following the 
Supreme Court’s reversal, the Federal Circuit reheard the divided direct 
infringement issue and expanded its direct infringement ruling.318 
2.  The Role of Tortious Intent 
The policy concern of the en banc Federal Circuit majority reflects the 
potentially significant impact of divided infringement upon the role of 
purposive action in direct patent infringement. The majority sought to 
abrogate the single-entity rule319 because where multiple actors at arm’s 
length “share performance” of the steps in a patented method, “the 
patentee has no remedy, even though the patentee’s rights are plainly 
being violated by the actors’ joint conduct.”320 With divided infringement 
now necessarily a question of direct infringement, however, true strict 
liability that disregards any intent whatsoever cannot furnish the 
purposive action necessary to “share” performance or to produce “joint” 
                                                                                                                     
 315. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 316. The en banc question in Akamai was whether the direct infringement doctrine should 
preserve the so-called “single-entity rule” whereby all steps in a patented method must be 
performed by, or attributable to, a single entity for liability to arise. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 317. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1319 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 1337–38 (Linn, J., 
dissenting). 
 318. See Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117 (“Assuming without deciding that the Federal Circuit’s 
holding in Muniauction [that the single-entity requirement for direct infringement is appropriate] 
is correct.”); id. at 2120 (observing pointedly that “on remand, the Federal Circuit will have the 
opportunity to revisit the § 271(a) question [that direct infringement requires a single entity] if it 
so chooses”). On rehearing, the Federal Circuit held that “Section 271(a) is not limited solely to 
principal-agent relationships, contractual arrangements, and joint enterprise, as the vacated panel 
decision held. Rather, to determine direct infringement, we consider whether all method steps can 
be attributed to a single entity.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 
1023 (2015). 
 319. Though the Supreme Court identified the single-entity rule with the decision in 
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008), Muniauction had 
built on the earlier holding in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380–82 
(Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). The en banc Federal Circuit 
majority in Akamai wrote to address the conflict in past rulings on the single-entity rule of both 
Muniauction and BMC. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1318–19 (majority opinion) (overruling BMC). 
 320. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1305–06. 
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conduct in a meaningful sense.321 
Put another way, any theory of direct infringement that purports to 
account for divided infringement must show that legally distinct actors 
have, indeed, acted with some minimal cooperative purpose so that the 
law has a principled reason for treating their various partially infringing 
activities as a collective whole. The actors need not have any joint or 
individual intent to infringe a patent, nor even any joint or individual 
knowledge that such a patent exists—but to be cooperative, their actions 
must proceed from a purpose to accomplish a mutually known and 
intended result. Without this minimal cooperative purpose as to the act 
itself, any liability for divided direct infringement would necessarily 
impose a joint penalty upon independent actors who need not have had 
any notice of each other’s conduct. In fact, the Federal Circuit rehearing 
decision in Akamai proceeded along similar lines by defining divided 
infringement not by reference to particular forms of cooperation (such as 
the “direction or control” test or the “joint enterprise” test) but rather by 
reference to the fact of cooperation, i.e., whether all the steps were 
attributable to a single entity.322 
The following example illustrates the inappropriateness of imposing 
direct infringement liability collectively on entities that are purposively 
independent of each other. 
 Acme Corp. holds U.S. Patent ’816, issued in 2003 and expiring in 
2020, whose only claim is directed to a rolling chair assembly method 
comprising: 
o Step 1: securing a first terminal end of each of four legs onto a 
first side of a first two-sided flat surface suitable for sitting; 
o Step 2: securing a suitable wheel onto a second terminal end of 
each said leg; and 
o Step 3: securing a second two-sided flat surface orthogonally onto 
a second side of said first two-sided flat surface. 
 Since 2004, Betel, Inc. of South Carolina has produced floor seats 
whose assembly practices only the third step of the ’816 Patent. 
 Since 2010, independent and ignorant of Betel, Cassco Ltd. of Oregon 
has produced wheeled tables whose assembly practices only the first 
two steps of the ’816 Patent. 
 As neither Betel nor Cassco has practiced every step of the patent 
claim, neither entity alone is liable for direct infringement.323 
                                                                                                                     
 321. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text. 
 322. Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1022–23.  
 323. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980) (noting that 
direct infringement requires practicing “every single element” of the claimed invention). 
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 Yet under a doctrine of divided direct infringement that requires no 
minimal cooperative purpose or tortious intent common to both Betel 
and Cassco, Acme could hold them jointly liable even though their 
geographic and temporal separations reflect their purposive 
independence from each other. 
In short, a principled approach to the timely issue of divided patent 
infringement requires a legal basis for evaluating the alleged infringers’ 
conduct collectively, and that legal basis must establish some minimal 
cooperative purpose to achieve a mutually known and intended result. 
The doctrine of tortious intent supplies this necessary purposive action 
proceeding from well-understood tort principles. Importantly, the 
doctrine of tortious intent does not impose any greater requirement, 
leaving intact the settled patent law that direct infringement does not 
require knowledge of a patent nor any intent to infringe it. 
E.  Claim Construction 
Fourth, with respect to claim construction, the doctrine of tortious 
intent provides a conceptual vehicle for courts to engage more 
transparently in claim construction that is purposive rather than solely 
linguistic.324 
1.  Linguistic vs. Purposive Construction 
The U.S. patent system operates in a peripheral claiming regime in 
which claims describe the outer bounds of the invention rather than a 
central claiming regime in which claims describe the core principles of 
the invention.325 Consistent with the broad remit of this approach to 
claiming, patent rights are also defined primarily by reference to 
necessary and sufficient characteristics rather than by reference to 
exemplars from which the law must subsequently infer the appropriate 
scope of attendant legal rights.326 Given this focus on the patent claim as 
being both denotative of the invention and synonymous with the scope of 
                                                                                                                     
 324. For a comprehensive theoretical treatment of the distinction between determining the 
linguistic meaning of claims (interpretation) and giving legal effect either to that interpreted 
meaning or to some other normatively appropriate meaning (construction), see Tun-Jen Chiang 
& Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 
530, 546, 553 (2013). 
 325. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (distinguishing between peripheral claiming and central claiming); Burk & Lemley, supra 
note 129, at 1744–46 (same). 
 326. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 732–34 
(2009). 
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exclusionary rights,327 it is not surprising that construction of patent 
claims is the essential step in evaluating infringement.328 As a practical 
matter, claim construction is frequently outcome-determinative of 
litigation itself.329 For all its importance, however, claim construction 
remains a highly contentious practice, not merely between individual 
litigants who maneuver for a strategically favorable reading of the claims-
in-suit, but among courts and commentators who embrace divergent 
theories of how generally to construe claims and how not to. 
This theoretical debate has two major dimensions. One is procedural 
and ultimately structural: the allocation of the authority to construe claims 
with some measure of finality or deference. As the Court explained in 
Markman, the legal conclusion of what claim terms mean has long been 
a question of law for de novo appellate review.330 The en banc Federal 
Circuit in Cybor further interpreted Markman to mean that claim 
construction is a pure question of law with no distinct subsidiary 
questions of fact.331 Recently, after more than fifteen years under Cybor, 
the Federal Circuit, invoking stare decisis in Lighting Ballast, once again 
affirmed claim construction to be a pure question of law.332 The Supreme 
Court recently decided the issue in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc.333 Teva framed the issue as a conflict between a patent-
                                                                                                                     
 327. The succinct and oft-cited expression of this principle is Judge Giles Rich’s maxim that 
“the name of the game is the claim,” i.e., that claims define what is patented and, necessarily, give 
notice of what infringes and what does not. Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and 
Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 
497, 499, 501 (1990). 
 328. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, 
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2013). 
 329. See Kyle J. Fiet, Restoring the Promise of Markman: Interlocutory Patent Appeals 
Reevaluated Post-Phillips v. AWH Corp., 84 N.C. L. REV. 1291, 1292–93 (2006); Daniel J. 
Melman, Note, Post Markman: Claim Construction Trends in the Federal Circuit, RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. para. 2 (Spring 2001), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v7i4/note2.html; Stephanie Ann Yonker, 
Post-Phillips Claim Construction: Questions Unresolved, 47 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 301, 
303 (2007). 
 330. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1995) (recalling that “[t]he 
first [element of a patent case] is a question of law, to be determined by the court, construing the 
letters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim annexed to them” 
(quotations omitted) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853)). 
 331. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(finding that “[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed 
a silent, third option—that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of 
fact”), abrogated by Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 332. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1283–85 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (addressing and rejecting various criticisms by reference to the 
precedential value of Cybor and the potential tumult of reversing that decision), vacated and 
remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015). 
 333. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
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exceptionalist Federal Circuit doctrine that requires de novo review of the 
factual findings that a district court makes in support of its claim 
construction and the general command of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a), which requires review of such factual findings for clear error.334 
The Court held that Rule 52(a) does apply to subsidiary facts in claim 
construction—thus abrogating Lighting Ballast—and that appellate 
review of such facts must be deferential.335 
The question of appellate deference has important consequences for 
certainty and stability, especially because the net effect between 
horizontal and vertical certainty is not always clear a priori.336 These 
arguments have special force in patent claim construction,337 particularly 
in light of the vigorous debate over certainty in boundary notice for the 
patent system.338 Nevertheless, the procedural allocation of the power to 
construe is ultimately of second-order importance to the more immediate 
challenge confronting judges. 
That challenge is the substantive question of how to construe patent 
claims. The Federal Circuit’s authoritative articulation in Phillips v. AWH 
Corp.339 of the claim construction doctrine shed some light on the relative 
importance of various analytical tools but left unstated any systematic 
approach to the actual work of claim construction.340 This work includes 
evaluating intrinsic evidence of claim meaning such as the patent 
specification,341 prosecution history,342 and the fate of related and foreign 
applications,343 as well as a panoply of extrinsic evidence such as 
                                                                                                                     
 334. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2014 WL 
230926 (2014) (No. 13–854) (stating the question presented). 
 335. 135 S. Ct. at 835. On remand, the Federal Circuit applied the corrected standard of 
appellate review for the district court’s claim construction—de novo review of the overall claim 
construction and clear error review of the facts underlying the claim construction—and reached 
the same outcome. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 336. Compare Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 585 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (anticipating greater predictability through de novo review in Equal Access 
to Justice Act cases because courts of appeals would not be obligated to uphold divergent but 
reasonable district court holdings), with Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010) 
(anticipating greater predictability through deferential review in Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act cases because employers could rely upon plan administrators rather than 
“unexpected and inaccurate plan interpretations that might result from de novo judicial review”). 
 337. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra Section I.B. 
 339. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 340. See Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim 
Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 718 
(2010). 
 341. Id. at 722–23. 
 342. Id. at 723. 
 343. Id. at 723–24. 
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“inventor testimony, expert testimony, dictionaries, and documentary 
evidence of how the patentee and alleged infringer have used the claim 
terms.”344 
The animating principle of the Phillips approach is fidelity to the 
linguistic meaning of claim language, but such meaning is often not 
enough to produce a complete analysis of the claims.345 As a result, courts 
must make normative judgments about how much legal effect, if any, to 
give to the linguistic meaning of claims and, by comparison, how much 
legal effect to give to some other point of reference, such as their 
understanding of the inventive idea at the core of the patent.346 Indeed, a 
number of scholars have advocated for a return to the inventive idea of 
the patent as a way to manage perceived excesses both in the breadth of 
patent scope and the breadth of patent assertion. The strongest of these 
arguments is for an explicit and radical return to central claiming.347 A 
relatively milder argument is for a refocused view of peripheral claims as 
useful proxies in identifying the invention rather than as necessary 
synonyms of the invention itself.348 The interpretation-construction 
distinction offers a way to clarify that the task of identifying the invention 
is often a normative exercise beyond the linguistic meaning of claims.349 
To this line of argument, the doctrine of tortious intent contributes further 
by enabling what is otherwise a desirably transparent but perhaps 
“politically costly” choice by judges: construing purposively.350 
2.  The Role of Tortious Intent 
Purposive construction refers to deriving meaning from a document’s 
text based on the purposes for which the document was constituted, 
whether the text is of a statute, a contract, or anything else.351 In the case 
                                                                                                                     
 344. Id. at 725. 
 345. See Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 535–36. 
 346. Id. at 565–66. 
 347. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 129, at 1747 (describing their own proposal as a radical, 
but useful, thought experiment and leaving open the question of whether the benefits of returning 
to central claiming would outweigh the costs). 
 348. See Liivak, supra note 152, at 42–43. Professor Liivak’s proposal is a single analytical 
approach for navigating the embodiments disclosed in a patent. Id. at 43–44. For a more 
methodological argument that courts should choose from among various methodologies of 
construing claims to reach socially optimal claim scope, see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent 
Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
49, 128 (2005). 
 349. Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 566 (cautioning that “to the extent that a judge 
chooses the linguistic meaning as his lodestar, the linguistic meaning may run out”). 
 350. See id. at 585 (referring to construing a patent to save its validity, which is a special 
case of purposive construction). 
 351. See Nicholas Pumfrey et al., The Doctrine of Equivalents in Various Patent Regimes—
Does Anybody Have It Right?, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 261, 287 (2009). For a concise history of 
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of patents, purposive construction is the analysis of patent claims with a 
view to what they exist to protect: the inventor’s invention.352 In fact, the 
controversy in Phillips was such a case. 
Phillips was nominally about how to understand the term “steel 
baffle” in the context of Edward Phillips’s invention for a noise-, fire-, 
and impact-resistant steel building material, which was particularly suited 
for deflecting bullets.353 Phillips was unable to prove infringement by 
AWH Corporation under a claim construction where the patent failed to 
cover steel baffles that did not deflect bullets due to their perpendicular 
orientation to the adjoining wall faces; rather, the patent covered only 
steel baffles that were oriented at an oblique or acute angle to deflect 
bullets.354 The en banc Federal Circuit divided over whether the linguistic 
meaning of “steel baffles” in the ’798 Patent was limited to those steel 
baffles which deflect bullets.355 
There is force to Professors Tun-Jen Chiang and Lawrence Solum’s 
argument that the majority as well as the dissent in Phillips 
unproductively focused on the linguistic meaning of the term “steel 
baffles.”356 That term was neither ambiguous nor vague, though it may 
have rendered the patent overly broad if the court had read the term in its 
plain, linguistic meaning.357 In fact, implicitly and opaquely, the Phillips 
majority did just that, adopting a theory of construction that would give 
effect to the linguistic meaning, whereas the dissent favored the purpose 
of the invention rather than the linguistic meaning of the claims.358 The 
court would have done better to articulate transparently that its task was 
to decide whether and to what extent to give legal effect to this linguistic 
meaning.359 Yet neither theory of construction is inherently preferable to 
the other. Distinguishing claim interpretation from claim construction is 
a highly useful exercise, but ultimately it is a descriptive one. 
The doctrine of tortious intent, too, is amenable to either approach of 
construction, though it does allow purposive construction to be more 
                                                                                                                     
purposive construction as a tool for construing written instruments and applying that history to 
patent construction, see Catherine Ng, The Purpose of “Purposive Construction,” 15 INTELL. 
PROP. J. 1 (2000).  
 352. See Pumfrey et al., supra note 351, at 287. 
 353. Id. at 1310–11; U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798. 
 354. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 355. Id. at 1312–19. 
 356. Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 536 (describing the court’s approach as “a fool’s 
errand” because the true dispute was over whether to give legal effect to the linguistic meaning of 
“steel baffle” and thus “arguably extend the monopoly scope of the patent to something that the 
patentee had not really invented”). 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. at 569–70. 
 359. See id. 
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transparent.360 There is simply nothing in the record of the Phillips case 
showing that AWH Corporation had no intention to build steel supports 
containing steel baffles that were perpendicular to the adjoining wall 
faces and as such could not deflect bullets. Thus, there was clearly 
tortious intent to do something of interest. Whether that something 
constitutes infringement depends on how the court ultimately construes 
the claims. However, while conceptually agnostic, the doctrine of tortious 
intent is particularly well-suited for purposive claim construction because 
it mitigates the aversion that courts may have to making their normative 
choices in claim construction explicit.361 The Phillips dissent, by focusing 
on its own understanding of what Edward Phillips actually invented 
rather than on the text of the ’798 Patent, clearly and necessarily 
disrespects the USPTO examination that produced the overbroad 
patent.362 Rather than soften this conclusion through a linguistic 
distortion of what the claim must mean, however, it is preferable to 
engage expressly in a purposive construction that is more clearly justified 
because the alleged infringer’s tortious intent does not extend to making, 
selling, or using what the patentee’s invention actually is. As with the 
interpretation–construction distinction, this is not to say that a purposive 
approach is necessarily preferable, only that transparent purposivism is 
preferable and that the doctrine of tortious intent offers a way to be more 
transparent. 
In fact, a basis already exists in the case law for this link between 
purposive claim construction and tortious intent. Both early and modern 
examples of tortious intent, including the previously discussed Pratt363 
and Pall Corp.,364 are examples of purposive claim construction. In Pratt, 
the infringement dispute was clear enough. The asserted patent covered 
a mechanism that hooked an airplane in flight to a stationary arresting 
apparatus and thus gradually retarded the airplane’s vertical and forward 
speed to land it in a very short distance.365 The alleged infringing 
mechanism on the government’s naval aircraft carriers, by design, 
hooked an airplane that had landed on the deck and thus retarded only its 
forward progress.366 To arrive at this technical, factually specific 
distinction between the patented invention and the allegedly infringing 
invention, however, the court construed the patent specifically with an 
eye to naming its purpose and, incidentally, to preserving its validity: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 360. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
 361. See Chiang & Solum, supra note 324, at 585. 
 362. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 363. See supra notes 248–50 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text. 
 365. Pratt v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 461, 475 (Ct. Cl. 1941). 
 366. Id.  
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In the instant case, it would not be a proper application of 
the purpose of the patent laws to construe plaintiff’s assumed 
patent for a device to retard the speed of a plane while still 
in flight so broadly as to prevent the development and use by 
others of a device to stop the roll of a plane after it has 
touched the landing surface. The two ideas are different. 
Indeed, plaintiff’s asserted novelty lay only in the 
accomplishment of the former, since the latter was plainly 
anticipated.367 
The court also made plain the connection between its purposive approach 
to construction and the pragmatic importance of what the defendant did 
and did not intend to do: 
But because the whole problem arises out of the necessity 
for landing planes on a surface of limited area, and because 
the accomplishment of the feat is at best a hazardous one 
involving great skill, the defendant, desiring to retard the 
speed of the plane after it has touched the surface, should not 
be compelled, in order to avoid infringement, to waste a 
considerable amount of the limited landing area by locating 
its transverse cables so far forward on the deck that its planes 
will never engage one of the cables until after they have 
touched the landing surface.368 
Likewise, in Pall Corp., the asserted patent covered a venting system 
for filtering leukocytes from blood through porous membranes that 
prevent the passage of air into a filtration chamber.369 Like the court in 
Pratt, the court in Pall Corp. bounded its construction of the patent by its 
understanding of the purpose of the invention itself: 
We deem the district court’s claim construction to be unduly 
broad. The ’321 patent explains that the invention is directed 
to facilitating the air-driven gravity flow of blood through 
the leukocyte filter, reducing back pressure and minimizing 
air contact with the blood after the filtration is complete. The 
specification describes or suggests no role or location of the 
“gas outlet comprising a porous medium” other than to 
remove gas at the outlet of the system while retaining the 
blood and barring reentry of air. We conclude that the correct 
interpretation of claim clause [2] requires that the gas outlet 
porous medium be placed so as to serve that purpose.370 
                                                                                                                     
 367. Id. at 476 (emphasis added). 
 368. Id. (emphasis added). 
 369. Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 370. Id. at 1310 (emphasis added). 
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These cases illustrate that the doctrine of tortious intent can valuably 
clarify the practical consequences of construing patent claims 
purposively, apart from the merits of purposivism itself.371 Indeed, the 
tortious intent of the alleged infringer and a purposive understanding of 
the patentee’s claims are different sides of the same coin, for both reflect 
what was intended to be accomplished with respect to the given 
technology. This symmetry is, in fact, one that patent law has long 
recognized, connecting the patentee’s desire to design around the prior 
art with the implementer’s desire to design around the patent.372 
CONCLUSION 
The central argument of this Article has been that direct patent 
infringement is not a strict liability tort and that its designation is quite 
harmful given the high stakes of notice failure that true strict liability 
would implicate for the patent system. In place of this mistaken strict 
liability view, the text of the Patent Act and the historical understanding 
of patent infringement as an analogue of trespass in real property support 
a reframing of direct patent infringement as an intentional tort. The 
tortious intent of interest in this new doctrinal inquiry is an intent to 
perform an act that constitutes infringement: making, selling, or using an 
invention that happens to be patented. Neither a knowledge of patent nor 
any intent to commit infringement is necessary, just as they have been 
unnecessary for direct infringement thus far. 
Moreover, the doctrine of tortious intent offers considerable practical 
benefit for a number of doctrinal debates currently ongoing in the patent 
system. First, it offers a conceptual basis for resolving the Supreme 
Court’s incomplete recent Limelight decision regarding divided patent 
infringement.373 Second, it is consonant with the interpretation-
                                                                                                                     
 371. Related to the merits of construing patent claims purposively (i.e., based on the 
invention whose protection is the purpose of the patent) are the merits of construing patent claims 
with an eye toward the litigation outcomes of that construction. Professors Robert Merges and 
John Duffy argue, for example, that courts cannot help but interpret claims in the context of the 
particular infringement determinations that they face. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 907–08 (3d ed. 2002). Professors Dan Burk 
and Mark Lemley agree, and even suggest that this may be a strategically appropriate outcome in 
the adversarial civil litigation system. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent 
Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 50 (2005) (noting that “a judge’s decision will 
effectively take the infringement decision away from the jury altogether in most cases by selecting 
a claim interpretation so constrained that it leaves no room for more than a single outcome” and 
arguing that “if a judge’s construction doesn’t have this effect, it likely means the patent lawyers 
on one side or the other haven’t done their job”). 
 372. Cf. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
(2000) (highlighting the coordination that occurs between the designers and the artists).  
 373.  See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
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construction distinction in analyzing patent claims and offers a normative 
justification for engaging transparently in purposive claim construction 
as part of the growing scholarly emphasis toward decoupling the 
invention from the peripheral claim. Third, it offers a jurisprudential cure 
both to the Federal Circuit’s ill-advised expansion in the SmithKline 
decision of inherent anticipation doctrine and to that expansion’s as-yet-
unrealized corollary, inherent infringement and its true strict liability 
consequences.374 
Fourth, and most generally, the doctrine of tortious intent provides an 
explicit policy lever for mitigating the naturally divergent effects of 
patent boundary notice upon different economic actors depending on 
their place and function in the technological marketplace. The doctrine 
does so by exploiting the logical relationship between the specificity with 
which various economic actors engage with technology and the 
awareness, hence the purposive action, that the law may properly ascribe 
to those actors in possessing the tortious intent to perform the actions that 
may constitute infringement. Thus, manufacturers, who are likely to be 
most directly engaged, will tend most likely to act with tortious intent, 
and the doctrine will disrupt little in the current state of affairs. Sellers, 
who are likely to be engaged with greater variation depending on their 
place in the stream of commerce, will tend to act with tortious intent in 
proportion to their engagement with the technical details of the goods that 
they sell, and thus in proportion to their economically practicable ability 
to avoid infringement at low cost. And users, particularly end users who 
are likely to be least directly engaged with the technical details of 
inventions—especially highly integrated products comprising large 
numbers of component inventions—will tend least likely to act with 
tortious intent and will be most likely exempt from infringement liability. 
In this way, the doctrine of tortious intent also provides a systematic 
underpinning for various existing proposals to provide such a 
discriminant function within infringement doctrine, proposals that have 
thus far remained pragmatic departures from the general body of patent 
law. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 374.  See supra notes 302–12 and accompanying text. 
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